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"Thou shalt not kill."'
- Old Testament
"2
"I wish to God the men I know would help me now.
-Eva Coo, convicted murderer, 1930
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a landmark death penalty case, McCleskey v. Kemp, defendant
Warren McCleskey, a Black man, appealed his conviction and death
sentence4 on the grounds that Georgia's death penalty scheme
violated both the Eighth Amendmente to the United States
Constitution and his equal protection rights as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.6 McCleskey based his claimed violation of
the Equal Protection Clause 7 on a study of murder cases in Georgia
during the period from 1973 to 1978," conducted by David Baldus,
Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth ("Baldus study"). 9 The
Baldus study included one model that accounted for more than
thirty-nine non-racial variables in death penalty cases.'0 Unlike
studies preceding it, the Baldus study did not focus on the race of
defendants convicted and death-sentenced," but rather on the race
1. Exodus 20:13.
2. L. Kay Gillespie, DANCEHALL LADIES: THE CRIMES AND EXECUTIONS OF AMERICA'S
CONDEMNED WOMEN 33 (1997).
3. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
4. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 283-84 (1987) (stating that McCleskey was
convicted for killing a police officer during a robbery).
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (stating that cruel and unusual punishments will not be
inflicted). McCleskey's contention was that Georgia's death penalty scheme fostered arbitrary
and unfair imposition of the death sentence based on race and that this arbitrariness
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. See McCeskey, 481 U.S. at 286 (noting that
McCleskey argued that the capital punishment process in Georgia was administered in a racially
discriminatory way).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that no state shall deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws); see also McCskey, 481 U.S. at 286 (noting that
McCleskey raised 17 other claims in his defense).
7. MeClesky, 481 U.S. at 286.
8. BARRY LATZER, DEATH PENALTY CASES: LEADING U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES ON
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 231 (1998).
9. See McCLeskey, 481 U.S. at 286 (stating that the Baldus study examined 2,000 murder
cases).
10. See McCkeskey, 481 U.S. at 287 (discussing the Baldus study). After subjecting data to
extensive analysis, one of the models in the study concluded that, even after accounting for 39
non-racial variables, a Black defendant who kills a White victim has the greatest likelihood of
receiving the death penalty. See id. (noting that prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of
cases involving Black defendants and White victims compared to 19% of cases involving White
defendants and Black victims).
11. See LATZER, supra note 8, at 231 (citing M. Wolfgang & M. Reidel, Race, Judicial
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of the defendants' victims. 2

It illustrated that when the victims of

homicide were White, it was statistically likely that the defendant
would be convicted and sentenced to death."3
The Supreme Court's standard for showing an equal protection
violation has historically been "proof of purposeful or intentional
discrimination."
This is the standard the Court adopted in the
McCleskey decision. 5 Racially disproportionate impact has rarely been
viewed as proof of a constitutional violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. 6 The Court accepted the Baldus study as statistically valid, 7
but refused to acknowledge that the study proved any actual
discrimination in Georgia's capital justice system. 8
It rejected
McCleskey's claims of constitutional violations, and specifically his
claims of an equal protection violation. 9
McCleskey addresses an alleged equal protection violation based on
racial discrimination. It is clear, however, from the plurality opinion
that the Justices feared implications far beyond that of racial
discrimination in capital cases. Justice Powell wrote:
Discretion, and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE 119-33 (1973) (studying defendants in rape cases in 11 southern states during
the period 1945 to 1965 and noting that during these years a conviction for rape was punishable
in the United States by a sentence of death)).
12. See LATZER, supranote 8, at 231 (discussing the disparity of the imposition of the death
penalty when the victim is Black versus a White victim).
13. See David C. Baldus, George Woodworth & Charles J. Pulaski, Jr., Law and Statistics in
Conflict: Reflections on MCleskey v. Kemp, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 147,
148, Table 13.2 (Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth eds., 1994) [hereinafter Law and Statistics]
(enumerating variables accounted for, and presenting the outcome that when one or more
victims of murder is White it is 4.2 times more likely that the defendant will be sentenced to
death).
14. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-44 (1976) (discussing standards for
establishing racial discrimination). "[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law
or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact." Id. at 239; see also
LATZER, supranote 8, at 232 (discussing the type of proof needed before the Court will consider
constitutional claims).
15. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (setting forth the principle that a defendant alleging an
equal protection violation has the burden of proving "the existence of purposeful
discrimination") (citing Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545,550 (1967)).
16. See LATZER, supra note 8, at 232 (stating that racially discriminatory impact was not
enough to demonstrate an equal protection violation but statistical evidence of different
treatment of Blacks and Whites might be).
17. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 n.7 (1987) ("We assume the study is valid
statistically....").
18. See id. ("Our assumption that the Baldus study is statistically valid does not include the
assumption that the study shows that racial considerations actually enter into any sentencing
decisions in Georgia.").
19. See id. at 292 (agreeing with the Court of Appeals that McCleskey's claim must fail).
20. See id. at 291 (stating that McCleskey argued that race "infected" the administration of
Georgia's death penalty statute).
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[I]f we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias has
impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could
soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty.
Moreover, the claim that his sentence rests on the irrelevant factor
of race easily could be extended to apply to claims based on
unexplained discrepancies that correlate to membership in other
minority groups, and even to gender... As these examples
illustrate, there is no limiting principle to the type of challenge
brought by McCleskey.

It seems the Court feared similar challenges based on various other
types of statistical evidence, with what it perceived to be no limit on
who could bring such challenges.22 With its refusal to recognize the
Baldus study as proof that McCleskey may have been wrongly
convicted based on his race, the Court attempted to curtail future
similar challenges.23 The Court held that proof of purposeful and
intentional discrimination must be established by each defendant,
specific to that defendant's case.24 This is arguably an unreasonable
threshold to meet. It almost requires a juror or judge to admit that
he or she purposefully discriminated against a defendant.
This Comment poses a challenge to the imposition of the death
penalty under the Equal Protection Clause, seeking to establish a case
of disparate impact on the basis of sex discrimination.2 It presents an

21. Id. at 315-18 (1987) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).

22. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 317-18 (1987) ("[If] arbitrary and capricious
punishment is the touchstone under the Eighth Amendment, such a claim could.., be based
upon any arbitrary variable.., that some statistical study indicates may be influential in jury
decision making.").
23. See id at 839 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the prospect of even more
widespread abuse of the capital sentencing system than that shown by McCleskey does not
justify "complete abdication" of thejudiciary's role).
24. See id. at 337 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court, citing a need for
individualized decisions, rejects evidence that race more likely than not infects capital
sentencing decisions). "The Court's position converts a rebuttable presumption into a virtually
conclusive one." Id
25. This Comment looks largely at statistics and studies that show a different standard of
treatment accorded men and women in the judicial system in the United States, particularly in
cases of murder. See discussion infra at Parts IV, IVA-B (examining data and studies that
illustrate this discrepancy in treatment). Historically, statistics have not always substantiated a
claim of discrimination on the basis of sex; they have, however, proved useful in establishing
claims of discrimination on the basis of race in employment cases. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETt
& ANGELA P. HARRiS, GENDER AND THE LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 165 (1998)
(noting that "especially pronounced statistical disparities" have been sufficient to show race
discrimination under Title VII). Statistics have not been enough to prove a sex discrimination
claim. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd, 839
F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). Statistics have not yet been accepted in cases of capital sentencing as
proof of either race or sex discrimination. See, ag., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)
(stating that there must be proof of discrimination in the case at hand). It is the author's hope
that eventually the Supreme Court will recognize both the validity of statistical evidence, and
the validity of applying such evidence to cases that come before it.
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argument similar to that raised in MCleskey, but based on sex s rather
than race. It confirms that men are disproportionately arrested and
convicted for murder, sentenced to death and executed in the
United States, as compared to women who commit substantially
similar crimes. 7 It argues that this discrimination on the basis of sex
is both purposeful and knowing, and thus, meets the Supreme
Court's threshold for finding a constitutional violation.
In light of the publicity and press surrounding the execution of
convicted murderer Karla Fay Tucker in Texas on February 3, 199828
it is timely to focus on the existing disparity between men and women
who are death-eligible for crimes they have committed. Convicted
male murderers receive the death sentence in proportionately
greater numbers than convicted female offenders. 29 Even when
statistics are adjusted to reflect the fact that men commit both greater
numbers and percentages of murders in the United States,30 men are
convicted and receive the death sentence at a disproportionately
greater rate than women.31
26. This Comment uses the term "sex" to distinguish betveen male and female, as opposed
to gender. See Leane Renee, Impossible Existence: The Clash of Transsexuals,Bipolar Categories, and
Law, 5 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 343, 346 n.11 (1997) (describing the difference between sex and
gender). "Sex is used in its realist, essentialist sense to mean a fundamental, natural, biological
determination of 'maleness' or 'femaleness'. . . gender, in contrast, is used to mean a culturally
determined, socially constructed, and historically variant description of those acts that compose
how an individual does 'being male' or 'being female.'" Leslie Pearlman, Transsexualism as
Metaphor: The Collision of Sex and Gender, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 835, 839-40 (1995) (quoting Druann
Pagliasotti, On the DiscursiveConstructionof Sex and Gender, 20 COMM. RES. 472,474-75 (1993)).
27. See Victor L. Streib, Death Penaltyfor Female Offenders, January 1, 1973 to the Present (last
modified June 1999) <http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/femdeath.hun> [hereinafter
Death Penaltyfor Female Offenders] (listing the small percentage of women that were arrested for
murder, sentenced to death, and executed).
28. See id. at 2 (noting that Tucker's case received world-wide attention). Karla Faye
Tucker and a companion were sentenced to death for bludgeoning two people to death with a
pickaxe, in June of 1983. See Mike Ward, Tucker's Plea Denied: Execution Set for Today, PAiM
BEACH POsr, Feb. 3, 1998, at 1A (describing the crime as a "drug-crazed" attack). While in
prison, Tucker became a born-again Christian and something of a celebrity. She claimed to
have found God and ministered to others in prison. See id. Despite pleas for clemency from
persons such as Pat Robertson and BiancaJagger, the Texas parole board and Governor George
W. Bush denied Tucker's request. Death Penalty Information Center, TheDeathPenalty in 1998:
Year-End Report (visited Jan. 6, 1999) <http://wv.essential.org/dpic/yrendrpt98.hnl>
[hereinafter Year-End Report] (stating that the execution prompted a reevaluation of Texas'
clemency process). Tucker was the first female in Texas to be executed since the Civil War, and
the first in the nation since 1984. See Tucker Offers Apology Before Texas Execution: Death Penalty
Debate Goes on OutsidePrison, PATRIOT LEDGER, Feb. 4, 1998, at 4 (noting that the execution of a
woman is rare).
29. See Death Penalty for Female Offenders, supra note 27 (arguing that females are "screened
out" of the capital punishment system).
30. See Death PenaltyforFemale Offenders, supra note 27 (noting that women account for one
in eight murder arrests, or 13%, whereas men account for the other seven of eight, or 87%).
31. See Death Penalty for Female Offenders, supra note 27 (indicating that women account for
only one in 53 death sentences imposed at the trial level, or 1.9%, and account for only three of
540 persons executed since 1970, or .6%). Streib defines 1973 and forward as the "modern era"

432

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 8:2

This Comment systematically establishes an existing disparate
impact that illustrates a violation of the Equal Protection Clause on
the basis of sex when imposing the death penalty. Part II discusses
the history of the death penalty in the United States, beginning with
debates over the meaning of the "cruel and unusual" clause in the
Eighth Amendment. 2 In the late 1800s and early 1900s, there was a
relatively brief period during which several states abolished death
penalty statutes altogether, although most reinstated these statutes
not long after their abolition." The debate continues today, with
of death penalty consideration. See id. at 5. He does this because of the Supreme Court's
holding in Furmanv. Georgia, that the death penalty, as applied, was unconstitutional. Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240-41 (1972). There were subsequent revisions of death penalty
statutes by the states, culminating with the Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976), which once again held state death penalty schemes to be constitutional. See id. at 187
("[T]he death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed...."). During
the period from 1970 to 1979, three people were executed, but none of them were women. See
Death PenaltyforFemaleOffenders, supra note 27, at 3 (setting forth a chronology of executions of
women in the twentieth century).
32. See, e.g., 2 J. ELLIOT'S DEBATEs 111 (2d ed. 1876) (quoting Rep. Holmes of
Massachusetts).
What gives an additional glare of horror to these gloomy circumstances is the
consideration, that Congress have [sic] to ascertain, point out, and determine what
kind of punishments shall be inflicted on persons convicted of crimes. They are
nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments, and
annexing them to the crime; and there is no constitutional check on them, but that
racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of their discipline.
Id.
Patrick Henry also feared the power of an unrestrained Congress. He addressed the Virginia
Convention on the Bill of Rights:
What says our [Virginia] bill of rights?-'that excessive bail ought not to be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.' Are you
not, therefore, now calling on those gentlemen who are to compose Congress, to...
define punishments without this control? Will they find sentiments there similar to
this bill of rights? You let them lose; you do more-you depart from the genius of
your country.
In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose the restriction of
not imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and inflicting cruel and
unusual punishments. These are prohibited by your [Virginia] declaration of rights.
What has distinguished our ancestors?-That they would not admit of tortures, or
cruel and barbarous punishment.
3J. ELUIOT'S DEBATES 447 (2d ed. 1876).
33. See generalyJohn F. Galliher, Gregory Ray & Brent Cook, Abolition and Reinstatement of
CapitalPunishmentDuringthe ProgressiveEraand Early 20th Century, 83J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
538, 538-76 (1992) (documenting the abolition and subsequent reinstatement of the death
penalty in eight of ten states). Colorado abolished the death penalty in 1897, but reinstated it
in 1901, long before other states abolished it. Kansas abolished the death penalty in 1907 and
reinstated it in 1935. Washington abolished it in 1913 and reinstated it in 1919. Oregon
abolished it in 1914, and reinstated it in 1920. South Dakota abolished the death penalty in
1915, and subsequently reinstated it in 1918. Tennessee also abolished the death penalty in
1915, but did not reinstate it until 1919. Arizona abolished it in 1916, and quickly reinstated it
in 1918. Missouri abolished it in 1917 and reinstated it in 1919. Minnesota abolished the death
penalty in 1911 and remains a state that has no death penalty. North Dakota abolished the
death penalty in 1915 and it, too, remains without a statute for implementing the death penalty.
See generally id. at 538-76 (discussing the status of the death penalty in the states).
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strong supporters for both maintaining and abolishing the death
penalty.'
Part II of the Comment discusses the failed challenges to the
constitutionality of the death penalty. These include challenges on
grounds of age,35 mental competency, 36 and race. 37 Although it can be
argued that many of these cases heard by the Supreme Court have
been compelling, the Court has remained consistent in upholding
the constitutionality of the death penalty.38 It has yet to hear an equal
protection challenge based on sex.
Part IV examines evidence of the disparate impact of the death
penalty in the United States on male and female offenders. It
compares numbers and percentages of capital crimes committed, the
perpetrators of those crimes, and the sentences handed down to
defendants. It discusses the similarities of crimes committed by male
and female offenders, and the often vastly different sentences each
receive. It explores various reasons for why men are treated more
harshly than women in trials for capital offenses. It discusses several
theories posited for women's preferential treatment in capital cases
and further contemplates whether some of these theories, if true,
offer support for the contention that the different treatment of men
in the capital justice system is intentional.
Part V proposes some recommendations for sparing both men and
women this unequal and unconstitutional treatment. This Comment
is written from the point of view that the death penalty as applied in
34. See, e.g., Amnesty International, Against the Death Penalty (visited Feb. 26, 1999)
<http://v.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/dp/against.htm>
(opposing capital punishment);
Wesley
Lowe,
Pro Death Penalty
Web
Page
(visited
Feb.
26,
1999)
<http://vvv.rit.edu/-ivw12461/cp.html> (supporting capital punishment); Justice for All,
Justice in the News (last modified Feb. 25, 1999) <http://vw.jfa.net/jfa/> (supporting capital
punishment); American Civil Liberties Union Freedom Network, Death Penalty (last modified
Jan. 21,
1999)
<http://v.adu.org/issues/death/hmdp.html>
(opposing
capital
punishment); U.S. Catholic Bishops' Statement on Capital Punishment (last modified Nov. 1980)
http://ivwv.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/angel/procon/bishopstate.html (opposing capital
punishment).
35. See generally Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (concluding that neither
historic nor modem societal consensus forbids imposing capital punishment on one who
murders at age 16 or 17); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821-38 (1988) (discussing the
minimum age at which one can be put to death under the auspices of the Constitution and a
consensus of state legislatures).
36. See generally Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328-40 (1989) (discussing mental
retardation as a factor to be considered when imposing capital punishment); Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986) ("Today, no State in the Union permits the execution of
the insane.").
37. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93 (1987) (holding that proof of racial
discrimination in general is not enough to prove racial discrimination in this particular
defendant's case).
38. See discussion infra at Parts IlIA-C (discussing challenges to the death penalty based
upon age, mental capacity, and race).
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the United States is inherently unconstitutional in all cases, because
its imposition is always arbitrary and capricious, and there is no real
way to circumvent these circumstances. One approach is to make the
system as uniform as possible.

This, however, infringes on the

consideration of each defendant as a singular individual. 9
Competing interests best serve to illustrate that the current system
cannot adequately redress the disparate impact on men and is
unconstitutional as applied. As such, the clearest solution to the
problem is the abolition of the death penalty.
The Comment concludes that the violation of the Equal Protection
Clause on the basis of sex is not simply a transgression of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but adds to the overall arbitrary nature of
the United States' system of capital punishment.0 Ultimately, the
argument is that the death penalty is in and of itself unconstitutional.
A challenge on the grounds of sex is only the latest in a long line of
challenges that attempt to prove the arbitrariness of the capital
system in the United States.41

II. HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES
A.

ColonialTimes to the Bill of Rights (1791)

From the earliest times of the colonies, the death penalty was
justified by reference to the Bible.42 It was applied for crimes that
39. See e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197 (1976) (noting that the Georgia death
penalty statute requires juries to focus on the characteristics of the person who commits the
crime). Jurors are instructed to inquire as to prior offenses and special mitigating facts about
the defendant. Id.
40. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 320 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (noting that despite all attempts
at safeguarding an elevated degree of care when imposing capital punishment, it is still four
times more likely that a defendant who kills a White victim will receive death than a defendant
who kills a Black victim). "Nothing could convey more powerfully the intractable reality of the
death penalty- 'that the effort to eliminate arbitrariness in the infliction of that ultimate
sanction is so plainly doomed to failure that it-and the death penalty-must be abandoned
altogether.'" Id. (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (Marshall,J., concurring
injudgment)).
41. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 305 (1989) (regarding the death penalty and
the mentally retarded); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1989) (discussing whether
the imposition of the death penalty for a crime committed by a minor constituted a violation of
the Eighth Amendment); McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 282-83 (discussing racial considerations when
determining if the death penalty should be imposed); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242-43
(1972) (discussing the seriousness of the crime committed and the punishment imposed).
42. "He that smiteth a man so that he die, shall so be surely put to death." Exodus 21:12.
"Who so sheddeth a man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made
he man." Genesis 9:6; see also New EnglandExecution Sermon and Condemned's Response (1686), in
CAPIrrAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 12 (Brian Vila &
Cynthia Morris eds., 1997) [hereinafter CAPrTAL PUNISHMENT] (describing 17th century New

England's capital crimes as being largely defined by biblical scripture and arguments in support
of the death penalty relying often on the "word of God").
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today would certainly not be considered death-worthy. 3 The laws of
capital punishment were modifications of English common law4 and
continued to be observed in the United States up to and beyond the
adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791.4
The particularly heinous executions carried out prior to the
adoption of the Bill of Rights may have prompted some of the
subsequent debates46 and changes to death penalty laws in the United
States.47 In 1786, Hannah Ocuish was condemned to death for the
4
murder of a sLx-year old child of a well-to-do family in Connecticut.
Although there was no question that Hannah committed the crime,
Hannah was very young, mentally retarded and had been abandoned
by her mother and passed through various foster homes.49 She was
sentenced to death despite all of these mitigating factors. 0 Thejudge
justified his sentence by telling the young girl of limited
understanding that "the sparing of you on account of your age,
would, as the law says, be of dangerous consequences to the public by
43. See The CapitalLaws of Massachusetts (1641), in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supranote 42, at 8
(describing the various crimes contained in the section of the Liberties entitled Capital [sic]
Laws, including offenses such as idolatry, witchcraft, and bestiality). It was only as recently as
1977 that administering the death penalty to convicted rapists was found to be a
disproportionate punishment for the crime committed and therefore unconstitutional. See
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (concluding that a sentence of death is excessive
punishment for the crime of rape).
44. SeeTHE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 3-4 (Hugo Adam Bedau
ed., 1997) [hereinafter DEATH PENALTY] (noting that although the colonies modified the law as
applied to the death penalty according to localities, all continued to authorize public execution
by hanging as the mandatory punishment for various crimes against the state, the person and
property); see also ANNJONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 29 (1996) (noting that colonial law on murder
mirrored English common law, including findings of premeditation, malice, cruelty, selfdefense and accidental homicide). "[W]here common law and the Bible parted, Massachusetts
followed the Bible - manslaughter, defined as unpremeditated and committed in the heat of
the moment," was punishable by death, according to the Bible. Id at 30. Leviticus 24:17 and
Numbers 35:20, 21 both prescribe that "if
any person slayeth another suddenly, in his ANGER or
CRUELTY of passion, he shall be put to death." Id.
(emphasis in original).
45. See DEATH PENALTY, supra note 44, at 4 (noting that the adoption of the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution was ultimately interpreted only as a prohibition on inflicting
death in its most cruel forms, such as crucifixion or burning at the stake, and not a strict
prohibition on the imposition of death as a punishment).
46. See ROGER LANE, MURDER IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 79 (1997) (discussing the movement
away from believing that crime wvas not a result of original sin, or a weak or corrupted will, but
instead a result of bad circumstances). Bad circumstance included bad company, bad families
and poverty or ignorance. Punishment continued to be used to deter persons from engaging in
anti-social behavior, but it also mutated so as to end in the rehabilitation of the criminal,
enabling him/her to return as a useful member to his/her society. IM.
47. See id (noting that most states ultimately did away with "cruel and unusual"
punishments such as whippings, brandings, cutting ears and slitting, nostrils, as well as capital
punishments such as burning at the stake and butchering).
48. The Execution of Hannah Ocuish, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supranote 42, at 18-19.
49. The Execution ofHannah Ocuish, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 42, at 18-19.
50. The Execution ofHannah Ocuish, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 42, at 19.
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holding up an idea, [sic] that children might commit such atrocious
acts with impunity.""1
B. Bill of Rights (1791) to FourteenthAmendment (1868)
After the adoption of the Bill of Rights, states began to define
varying "degrees" of murder. 2 During this time states also abolished
public executions; Pennsylvania was the first state to begin using
private executions in 1834."' Eleven years later, every state in New
England had abolished public executions. 4
It was also during this time that courts granted discretion in
sentencing to the jury,5 although the origins of this development are
unclear. 6 Two other notable developments occurred in death
penalty law during this period. One was limiting the crimes for which
a defendant
might face
n
• 57the death penalty; these considerations
tended to vary by region. A second development was the abolition
movement.58 Beginning with Michigan in 1847, 5 a scattered number
of states across the country abolished the death penalty; such
abolition was usually followed by later reinstatement of the death
51. The Execution ofHannah Ocuish, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supranote 42, at 19.
52. See Law and Statistics, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing this development as the resulting
compromise between those who wished to completely abolish the death penalty and those who
wished to retain it in its exact state). This was a first effort on the part of the defenders of
capital punishment to distinguish between those individuals the public perceived as evil enough
to deserve the death penalty, and those who the public perceived as simply bad. CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, supranote 42, at 19.
53. Law andStatistics,supra note 13, at 33.
54. Law andStatistics,supranote 13, at 33.

55. See LANE, supranote 46, at 101-02 (discussing the fact that it was in the early to mid1800s that a movement occurred in about 50% of the states to afford juries discretion in
imposing the death sentence in cases of first degree murder). This meant that there were no
cases in which the law required ajury to impose a death sentence on a defendant a finding of
life or death was completely discretionary on the part of thejury. This system of complete jury
discretion attracted much criticism. See, e.g., Benjamin N. Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do for
Law, Address Before the New York Academy of Medicine (Nov. 1, 1928), in LAxv & LITERATURE
70, 100-01 (1931) (objecting to giving juries unfettered discretion "under a cloud of mystifying
words" like "premeditation," "deliberation," and "malice aforethought"); Daniel Givelber, The
New Law ofMurder,69 IND. LJ. 375, 380-81 (1994) (discussingJustice Cardozo's objection to the
system ofjury discretion).
56. See DEATH PENALTY, supranote 44, at 5-6 (explaining that Tennessee and Alabama both
allowed jury discretion in sentencing for murder as early as 1841, and Louisiana as early as
1846; it is thought this was to allow the all-White juries to be more lenient with White
defendants).
57. See DEATH PENALTY, supra note 44, at 9 (explaining that death-eligible crimes in the
West might be for horse thievery or cattle rustling, while in the South crimes such as rape or
kidnapping might qualify). Punishment by death for the crime of rape was practiced in the
United States until the Supreme Court held it unconstitutional in 1977. Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 600 (1977).
58. DEATH PENALTY, supranote 44, at 8.
59. DEATH PENALTY, supranote 44, at 8.
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penalty.'
In the mid-1800s, the abolitionist movement took hold in the

United States.6 1John O'Sullivan, a well-known opponent of the death
penalty at the time, put forth an especially persuasive argument.12 He
asked that people:
[R] espect the life of man even in the person of the very wretch who
has himself forgot to respect it in the person of the victim he did
not spare. Treat as a madman him who could be guilty of such a
monstrous and stupendous outrage ugon his own proper natureand none but madmen will commit it.
Debates raged in the United States as the abolitionists pushed their
position and those who favored the death penalty pushed just as

hard, each side using eloquent prose to back up its argument.6

Debate over the death penalty shifted with the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.5 Eventually, courts interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment to mean that the states had an obligation to
apply the Bill of Rights to all persons equally. 66
Ideally, the
60. See Galliher, Ray & Cook, supra note 33, at 541 and accompanying text (discussing the
abolition and reinstatement of the death penalty in a variety of states). Scholars proffer various
reasons to explain the relatively quick reinstatement of the death penalty in early abolitionist
states. One is the non-repentant attitudes of convicted murderers who received life sentences.
Id. at 574. Another is that without a "legal" provision for implementing the death penalty,
people were taking the law into their own hands and carrying out illegal lynchings, primarily of
Black people. Id.
61. Galliher, Ray & Cook, supra note 33, at 541.
62. SeeJohn O'Sullivan, Document 18: Report in Favorof the Abolition of the Punishment ofDeath
by Law, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 42, at 52 (arguing that the United States should
abolish the death penalty because it violates the precepts of religious belief).
63. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supranote 42, at 53.
64. See generally Galliher, Ray & Cook, supranote 33, at 538 (documenting the rhetoric of
both abolition and death penalty supporters). "The fatal defect of the capital punishment
theory is that it cheapens life instead of magnifying it as its votaries have believed. The criminal
usually takes life hurriedly without much deliberation, but the law takes plenty of time and does
it deliberately." Id. at 546 (citing Letter from Governor E.W. Hoch to Robinette Scheier, Kansas
State Historical Society (Mar. 23, 1907)). "I subscribe, also, to the belief held by millions and
yet increasing millions, that capital punishment is a relic of barbarism; that the legalized taking
of life is a straining of Christ's law which has no place in modern civilization." Id. at 551
(quoting Governor Hunt, Mar. 12, 1912) (citing William L. Eaton, The Death Penalty in
Arizona (1864-1933), Arizona State Historical Society)). "I say there is law to crush and
obliterate the foul monster who stalks to kill...." Id, at 568 (citing Death Penalty in State is
Restored, SEATrLE TIMES, Mar. 12, 1919, at 9).
WVe have a large negro population in our state, many of them are ignorant and brutal.
I honestly think there are thousands of them that would commit murder for ten
dollars if they thought they would not be hung or electrocuted. These people and
some Wfites do not fear the penitentiary.
Galliher, Ray & Cook, supra note 33, at 557 (citing Letter from John P. Williams to Governor
Thomas Rye (Apr. 7, 1915) (on file with the Tennessee State Historical Society)).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (affirming that no state shall deny any person equal
protection of the laws).
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ramification of the Fourteenth Amendment, with respect to the
application of the death penalty, would be that courts no longer had
the ability to sentence Black defendants to death for crimes for which
they did not sentence White defendants to death. In practice, the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment had little effect on the
implementation of the death penalty6e
C. Twentieth Century
During the next several decades, the two World Wars
overshadowed the debate over the death penalty in the United
States.69 People struggled through wartime shortages, followed by a
depression and another war.70 As a result, debate over the death
penalty was not the greatest concern of most people.
In the early 1950s, the trial of accused spies Ethel and Julius
Rosenberg prompted the return of the death penalty to the forefront
of the public's attention. William H. Rehnquist, a Supreme Court
clerk at the time of the Rosenbergs' executions, stated in a
memorandum prior to their execution that "the Rosenbergs were
fitting candidates for the electric chair and that it is too bad that
drawing and quartering has been abolished."7' Not everyone shared
Rehnquist's sentiments. The trial and convictions prompted a
resurgence of debate over the death penalty, which played out
against the backdrop of the United States' recent war-torn decades
and its emerging Cold War status.7'4
67. See Document 23: The FourteenthAmendment Section 1, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supranote

42, at 65 (quoting Michigan Senate Joint Committee on Reconstruction member Jacob M.
Howard as explaining in 1866 that the Fourteenth Amendment "prohibits the hanging of a
Black man for a crime for which the White man is not to be hanged").
68. See generally McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287-92 (1987) (holding that proof of
racial discrimination in general, without other corroboration, is not enough to prove racial
discrimination in a particular defendant's case); see also infra notes 82-86 and accompanying
text.
69. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 42, at 75 (discussing the United States' struggle to
cope with its own growth as it went from an economic boom to a depression, through a war,
into another depression, through another war and, finally, into economic recovery and
prosperity).
70. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supranote 42, at 76.
71. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 42, at 76 (noting that during "the most

contentious [decade] since the controversy over slavery in the 1850s," reformers were focused
on relief programs and politics, and not on social reforms such as capital punishment).

72. See JANICE SCHUEIT, THE LOGIC OF WOMEN ON TRIAL: CASE STUDIES OF POPULAR

AMERICAN TRIALS 111,111 (1994) (noting that the Rosenbergs were tried in 1951 and convicted
in 1953).
73. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supranote 42, at 75.
74. See SCHUETrz, supra note 72, at 111 (discussing the trial of Ethel Rosenberg). Ethel
Rosenberg was aJewish woman of Eastern European immigrant parentage; as such, she grew up
poor working class, and associated with the garment unions and the Communist party. Id. at
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In the 1960s, the American public once again debated the use of
the death penalty.75 The controversy surrounding it, however, moved
from religious and moral considerations to legal considerations, such
as whether courts imposed the death sentence fairly and in
compliance with constitutional provisions.76 The 1960s and 1970s saw
several challenges to the imposition of the death penalty, including
challenges involving disproportionality of the punishment to the
crime committed,77 the state of mind of the defendant at the time of
the crime,78 the age of the offender, 79 the mental capacity of the
offender,0 and the race of the offender.8
In Furman v. Georgia,"2 the Supreme Court held that Georgia's
application of the death penalty, under its state statute of the time,

113. The prosecutors and the judge in her trial rationalized Rosenberg's conviction by stating
that she had abdicated her responsibilities [as a woman] by valuing Communism more than her
family. Id. at 115.
The only testimony against Ethel at her trial came from her brother and sister-in-law, both of
whom had admitted to being involved in a spy ring; no other witnesses ever connected Ethel to
the spy ring. Id. at 122. At the time, there was in the United States a penchant for "domestic
containment----"the idea that families should cultivate values and contain them within the
sphere of the home." SCRUETZ, supra note 72, at 114. Added to this was the heightened sense
of insecurity throughout the country. The Korean War and McCarthyism fostered the
perception that the Communist party was a threat to American security and survival. Id. at 118.
A majority ofjurors in the case wanted a conviction for Ethel; jurorJames Gibbons did not. Id.
at 121. He did not think that the state should execute mothers - other jurors convinced him to
vote to convict, because they were sure that the judge would not impose the death penalty. Id.
Gibbons voted to convict and all the jurors were surprised when the judge in the trial did, in
fact, sentence Ethel to death. Id. See also CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 43, at 76 (noting
that despite greater attention to the issue of the death penalty during high profile cases, the day
to day imposition of the death penalty faced little opposition in the United States).
75. Gerald Gottlieb, Document 46: Testing the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra
note 42, at 121.
76. See Gerald Gottlieb, Document 46: Testing the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
supra note 42, at 121 (proposing that capital punishment violates contemporary moral
standards).
77. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (holding that the death sentence is
disproportionate to crime of rape).
78. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800-01 (1982) (holding that states shall not
impose the death penalty on one who does not possess the intent to kill).
79. See generally Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (finding nothing to forbid
the imposition of the death sentence on one who is 16 or 17 years old at the time he or she
murders); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 818-38 (1988) (considering whether a
juvenile who was 15 at time of his offense was eligible for the death penalty).
80. See generally Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (holding that a jury could
consider mental incapacity as a mitigating factor and that this was enough to protect the rights
of a defendant who suffered from mental illness or incapacity); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399, 418 (1986) (remanding case to lower court with instruction that if it found the defendant
to be insane, it should not sentence him to death).
81. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297 (holding that proof of racial discrimination in general is
not enough to prove racial discrimination in a specific case).
82. 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972).
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was unconstitutional.83 States struggled to reconstruct their statutes

following the Furman ruling. In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia,4 the
Supreme Court once again recognized a state statute implementing
the death penalty as constitutional.8s During the years 1970 to 1979,
debate over the death penalty was intense and the Supreme Court
attempted to ensure "correct" application of the death penalty."
Only three executions took place during that time, and all three were
men.8 7 After a short hiatus in the mid-1970s, courts imposed the
death penalty fairly regularly throughout the 1980s and into the
1990s."' Between early 1980 and June of 1998, states executed 462
capital offenders, only three of whom were women. 9
IlI. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE DEATH PENALTY

A. Age
1.

Thompson v. Oklahoma

As recently as 1989, the Supreme Court considered at what the
minimum age courts may consider a juvenile death-eligible. 9 In
Thompson v. Oklahoma,92 the Court considered whether a defendant
who was fifteen years old at the time of his offense was eligible for the
death penalty. 9s After reviewing the history ofjuvenile executions in
the United States and surveying the minimum ages at which juveniles

83. See id. at 285-86 (holding that it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment to arbitrarily
subject a person to the death penalty).
84. 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (holding that the legislative guidelines of Georgia, and the
review function of the Supreme Court of Georgia, prevented the wanton imposition of the
death sentence and therefore Georgia's administration of the death penalty fell within
constitutional boundaries).
85. See id. at 187.
86. See supranote 31 and accompanying text (discussing the death penalty throughout the
seventies and eighties).
87. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (stating that states rarely used the death
penalty during the 1970s).
88. See Death Penalty for Female Offenders, supra note 27 (noting the regularity with which

courts have impoged death sentences throughout these decades).
89. DeathPenaltyforFemaleOffenders, supranote 27.

90. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
91. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 818-19 (1988) (considering whether a
juvenile who was 15 at the time of his offense was old enough for the court to deem him eligible
for the death penalty); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (finding nothing to
forbid the imposition of the death sentence on one who is 16 or 17 years old at the time he or
she murders).
92. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
93. See id. at 818-19.
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can engage in certain activities, such as voting and driving, 94 the

Court held that executing the defendant would violate the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.9 5
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion in Thompson.96 In support of
the prohibition against executing one who committed his or her
offense while under the age of sixteen,
he quoted from an earlier
97
Oklahoma case, Eddingsv. Oklahoma:
But youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to
influence and to psychological damage. Our history is
replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors,
especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and
responsible than adults. Particularly "during the formative
years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment" expected of adults.9
The Court seemed to realistically address the imprudence of
executing one who is a minor at the time he or she commits a crime."
It recognized an exemption for juveniles as a class from the capital
justice system."'
2.

Stanford v. Kentucky

11

The very next year, however, ignoring its own eloquent arguments
from Thompson,10 2 the Court held that a juvenile who commits a crime
at the age of sixteen is death-eligible.9
In deciding Stanford v.
Kentucky, the Court found no "historical nor modem societal
consensus forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on any
person who murders at sixteen or seventeen years of age,"0 4 and

94. See id. at 838.
95. See id.
96. Seeid. at 818.
97. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
98. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)).
99. See id at 824.
100. Seeid.at824-28.
101. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
102. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837 (noting it is unlikely that a teenage offender would make
any kind of cost-benefit analysis including the possibility of execution prior to committing a
crime). The Court goes on to say that "it is fanciful to believe that he would be deterred by the
knowledge that a small number of persons his age have been executed during the 20th
century." Id. at 838.
103. Stanfordv. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,380 (1989).
104. Id. at 380.
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redefined juveniles as a class as death-eligible. 11 It did this despite its
own recognition of the immaturity of juveniles' psychology 5 and
judgment 1 7 capabilities. It created an artificial dividing line to
establish a uniform system for determining the death-eligibility of
juveniles, despite its earlier recognition of the different
developmental capacities of juveniles.' s
Although the Court
delivered seemingly contradictory arguments in Thompson and
Stanford as to who courts consider a juvenile, it managed to uphold
the death penalty as constitutional, even in cases where the
defendant was arguably ajuvenile at the time of the crime.'0 9

B. Mental Competency
1. Ford v. Wainwright" °
The leading cases in which the Supreme Court considered the
issue of mental

competency as a

factor in

determining

death

eligibility are Ford v. Wainwright" and Penty v. Lynaugh."2 In Ford v.
Wainwright, the Court considered the case of Alvin Ford, who
appealed his death sentence on the grounds that he suffered from a
severe mental disorder and was unable to assist in his defense."' Ford

105. See id.
106. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834.
107. See id.
108. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823-35 (1988) (holding that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments preclude the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who was
sixteen at the time of his offense).
109. Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming
authorize a minimum age of 17 years. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULLETIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 5 (Table 4) (1997) [hereinafter BULLEIN]. California,

Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington and the Federal system have all established 18
years as the minimum age one must be to receive a death sentence. Id. The states of Arizona,
Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota and Utah do not
specify a minimum age. Id.; see also Jennifer Seibring Marcotte, Note: Death Penaltyfor Minors:
Who Should Decide, 20 S. ILL. U. LJ. 621, 629 (1996) (discussing the minimum ages for
execution in various jurisdictions); Elisabeth Gasparini,Juvenile CapitalPunishment:A Spectacle of
a Child's Injustice, 49 S.C. L. REV. 1073, 1084-85 (1998) (listing states' minimum age
requirements for executing juveniles).
110. 477U.S. 399 (1986).
111. Id.
112. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
113. See For, 477 U.S. at 403 (reporting that the doctor who examined Mr. Ford in 1983
concluded that he had a "major mental disorder... severe enough to substantially effect Mr.
Ford's present ability to assist in the defense of his life"). Competency to stand trial is a
different consideration from that of whether a defendant was insane at the time he or she
committed a criminal act. Id. at 406-08.
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did not contend that he was mentally incompetent at the time he
committed his crime, nor at his subsequent trial and sentencing, but
rather claimed that he became increasingly unstable during the time
he spent in prison."4 The Court held that if Ford proved his
allegations of insanity, the state should not execute him, and
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.115 It did so noting that
"the natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing one who has
no capacity ' to
come to grips with his own conscience or deity is still
16
vivid today."
2.

Penry v. Lynaugh

17

In 1989, the Court considered the case of Peny v. Lynaugh.1 5 In
this case, defendant Penry, who had the reasoning capacity of a seven-year old, challenged the imposition of the death sentence. 19 In
Peny, the Court did not follow its own precedent.12 0 Despite its prior
findings that it violated the Constitution to execute one who is
*
121
insane,
the Court found that the Constitution permits the
execution of one who is mentally retarded.
It determined that, as
long as the jury could consider mental incapacity as a mitigating
factor, this was enough of a safeguard to protect
the rights of one
2
who suffered from mental illness or incapacity
As it often does with death penalty cases, the Court construed a
very narrow interpretation of its previous decision. It relied on
"evolving standards of decency"1 24 and concluded that it was not the
time to preclude the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally
retarded.'25
114. See generally i& at 402 (describing the increasingly pervasive delusions Ford suffered in
prison).
115. Id. at417-18.
116. Id. at 409.
117. 492 U.S. 302, 307-09 (1989).
118. Id.
119. Peary, 492 U.S. at 308 (reporting that Penry confessed to the rape and murder of
Pamela Carpenter. Penry had mild to moderate retardation. Testing before trial revealed he
had an IQ of 54. The trial court convicted Penry of capital murder, rejecting his insanity
defense).
120. Id. at 340.
121. Ford,477 U.S. at 409.
122. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 340 ("[W]e cannot conclude today that the Eighth Amendment
precludes the execution of any mentally retarded person of Penry's ability convicted of a capital
offense simply by virtue of his or her mental retardation alone.").
123. See id. at 312.
124. Id. at 334.
125. See id. at 312.
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C. Race
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided McCleskey v. Kemp.2 6 Warren
McCleskey sought to have his death sentence overturned on both
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 2 7 and Eighth Amendment
arbitrariness grounds. 28 As proof of his claims, McCleskey offered
the comprehensive Baldus study."2 The Baldus study used a 230variable logistic multiple-regression model to determine when it is
most and least likely that a defendant will receive the death penalty.5 0
Baldus and his co-researchers used variables they considered both
conceptually and statistically important."" The study illustrated, quite
starkly, that defendants were most likely to receive a death sentence
in cases where their victim was white.
Despite the fact that the Court accepted the Baldus study as valid, it
rejected McCleskey's claims of a constitutional violation based on
racial discrimination, holding that proof of systemic racial
discrimination was not enough to prove that McCleskey had been
specifically affected by discrimination at his particular sentencing

126. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
127. See iL at 286 (claiming that Georgia administers its capital sentencing process in a
racially discriminatory manner, which violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution).
128. See id.; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274-77 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(discussing arbitrary imposition of death sentence as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment).
129. See McClskey, 481 U.S. at 286 (explaining that the Baldus study is actually two statistical
studies examining more than 2,000 murder cases in Georgia during the 1970s). The study
found that in cases where the victim was Black, the defendant received a death sentence only
1% of the time, whereas in cases where the victim was White, the defendant received a death
sentence 11% of the time. Id. In cases where the victim was White and the defendant was
Black, courts imposed the death penalty in 22% of cases; in cases where the victim was Black
and the defendant White, courts imposed the death penalty was imposed in only 8% of cases.
Id. The percentages were even more striking when illustrating cases in which prosecutors
sought the death penalty; in cases with White victims and Black defendants, prosecutors sought
the death penalty 70% of the time while they sought it in only 19% of cases where the victim
was Black and the defendant White. Id. at 287.
130. See Law and Statistics, supra note 13, at 133-35; see also McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287 n.5
(discussing the construction of the Baldus study). The 230-variable model divided cases into
eight ranges, according to the aggravation level of the crime. See id. at 287 n.5. The Baldus
study found that evidence of racial bias was most pronounced in the mid-range cases. Id. The
study illustrated that where there was the most room for juries to exercise discretion, the
greatest evidence of racial factors was present. Id. The McCleskey case fell into the mid-range
category. Id.
131. See Law and Statistics, supra note 13, at 147 n.4 (describing conceptually important
factors as those that are widely recognized by criminologists, prosecutors and legislators as
significant determinants of death-sentence outcomes, such as a serious prior record or multiple
victims). Statistically important factors are those which did, in fact, strongly correlate to the
likelihood that a defendant would receive a death sentence. Law and Statistics, supra note 13, at
147 n.5.
132. SeeMcClske, 481 U.S. at286.
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proceeding.'
The Court established a threshold of "exceptionally
dear proof " " before it would infer any abuse of discretion in the
Georgia capital sentencing system."' It rejected arguments raised by
McCleskey's attorneys based on both
a jury-selection model and the
136
employment discrimination model.
It is important to note that the McCleskey opinion is a plurality
opinion, not a majority opinion, and includes a well-reasoned and
persuasive dissent by four members of the Court 7 The dissenters
take issue with many of the conclusions Justice Powell reached in the
opinion. Significantly, Justice Brennan"' states that "[s]ince Furman,
the Court has been concerned with the risk of the imposition of an

133. See id.at 297 (holding that the Baldus study was clearly insufficient to support an
inference that any of the decision makers in McCleskey's case acted with discriminatory
purpose).
134. See i&i (noting that because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, the
Court demands exceptionally clear proof before inferring that discretion has been abused).
135. See id (holding that because criminal laws require the use of discretion, only
exceptionally clear proof would permit an inference of abuse of discretion).
136. See i& at 294 (rejecting both the venire-selection and Title VII arguments). "But the
nature of the capital sentencing decision, and the relationship of the statistics to that decision,
are fundamentally different from the venire-selection or Title VII cases." Id.
137. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 320 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (contending
that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment).
138. Justice Brennan was historically an opponent of the death penalty. Hejoined with the
majority and wrote his own concurring opinion in Fuman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), in
which the Court held that the death penalty as implemented by the states was unconstitutional.
His contention was that any punishment severe enough to be degrading to human dignity was
"cruel and unusual" punishment under the Eighth Amendment Id. at 281 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
It is a denial of human dignity for the State arbitrarily to subject a person to an
unusually severe punishment that society has indicated it does not regard as
acceptable, and that cannot be shown to serve any penal purpose more effectively than
a significantly less drastic punishment. Under... this test, death is today "cruel and
unusual" punishment.
Id. at 286.
The Court re-implemented the death penalty with its ruling in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976). Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in which he said that it is "my view that the
death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He included this phrase
when writing on the death penalty in subsequent cases, usually followed by his adjudged
disposition of the case. See, eg., Keenan v. California, 190 U.S. 1012,1012 (1989) (Brennan,J.,
dissenting) ("Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and
unusual punishment, prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would grant
certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case."); Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940,
942 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all
circumstances cruel and unusual punishment, prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, I would vacate the decision below insofar as it left undisturbed the death
sentence imposed in this case."); Banks v. Texas, 464 U.S. 904, 904-05 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and
unusual punishment, prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate
the death sentence inthis case.").
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arbitrary sentence, rather than the proven fact of one."" 9 He further
writes that "this emphasis on risk.., reflects the fact that concern for
arbitrariness focuses on the rationality of the system as a whole, and
that a system that features a significant probability that sentencing
decisions are influenced by impermissible considerations cannot be
regarded as rational."' 4° In Justice Brennan's language addressing
risk and arbitrariness lies the prospect of one day presenting to the
Court a persuasive equal protection argument regarding the death
penalty based on sex discrimination.
Justice Powell stated in the McCleskey opinion that:
McCleskey relies on "historical evidence" to support his claim of
purposeful discrimination by the State. This evidence focuses on
Georgia laws in force during and after the Civil War. Of course,
the "historical background of the decision is one evidentiary
source" for proof of intentional discrimination. But unless
historical evidences reasonably contemporaneous with the
challenged decision, it has little probative value. Although the
history of racial discrimination in this country is undeniable, we
cannot 4accept official actions taken long ago as evidence of current
intent.1 '

If the Court's true concern was that historical evidence of
discrimination be contemporaneous to the case for which it was cited,
recent "historical evidence" of sex discrimination is abundant in the
United States. 142 Paternalistic attitudes and actions toward women
have been abundantly documented throughout the centuries,
continuing into the 1990s.143 It is this attitude, still prevalent today,
139. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 322 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 323.
141. Id. at 298 n.20 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252,267 (1977) and Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228-33 (1985)).
142. See, e.g., California Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 274-77 (1987)
(considering whether the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 preempts a state's statute
requiring employers to provide leave to pregnant employees); City of Los Angeles, Dep't of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704 (1978) (considering whether employer may
charge women more for pension plan because they live longer than men); Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 54344 (1971) (considering whether employer could refuse to
hire women with pre-school aged children, while hiring men in the same category).
143. See, e.g., Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995) (notingJudge
Posner's determination on when it is appropriate for a woman to decide she has been sexually
harassed). "Itis no doubt distasteful to a sensitive woman to have such a silly man one's boss,
but only a woman of Victorian delicacy.., mysteriously aloof from contemporary American
popular culture ... would find [his] patter substantially more distressing than.., the cigarette
smoke of which the plaintiff does not complain." Id.; see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 684 (1973) (discussing the United States' history of paternalism):
[Olur Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.
Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of "romantic
paternalism" which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a
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that evidences discrimination "against" men and "for" women when
44
charging, convicting and sentencing defendants in capital cases.'
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION-DISPARATE IMPACT BY SEX
"She's run out of arguments. She's gonna be executed. A lot more
women aregonna be executed now."
Why's that?"
"Women's lobby. They all want equal treatment before the law."'

45

Since 1990, about ninety percent of the murders committed in the
United States have been committed by men.' m Even after accounting
for the fact that men are far more likely to commit murder than are
women, women are still less likely to be convicted and sentenced to
death; 4W-estimates for death sentences imposed at the trial level are
one in fifty-three or 1.9%.1' Presently, women comprise about 1.3%
of all persons on death row.49 It is extremely unlikely that even the
few women who are actually convicted and sentenced to death will
ever be executed.5 Professor Victor L. Streib l notes that, since the
earliest colonial times, executions of females have numbered 539 of
19,200 total executions, or a mere three percent. 5 1 Since 1900, even
cage ....
As a result of notions such as these, our statute books became laden with
gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes, and, indeed, throughout much of
the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in many respects,
comparable to that of Blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.
Id. at 684-85.
144. See discussion infra at Parts 1V.B-C.
145. THE LAST DANCE (Buena Vista 1997).
146. SeeLATZER, supranote 8, at 252 (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1995, Table 3.138).
147. See R. BARRI FLOWERS, FEMALE CRIME, CRIMINALS AND CELLMATES: AN EXPLORATION OF
FEMALE CRIMINALITY AND DELINQUENCY 217 (1995) (noting that women prisoners are rarely
sentenced to death or executed in the United States); see also Gerrie Ferris, Bill Hendrick &
Chris Burritt, The Susan Smith Case: Women Who Kill Usually Escape Ultimate Penalty, ATLANTAJ.
CONST., July 29, 1995, at 1OA (noting that, according to a former head of the Capital
Punishment Research Project at the University of Alabama, only one percent of the
approximately 2,000 women who commit murder each year are actually sentenced to death).
148. See DeathPenaltyforFemale Offenders, supra note 27, at 3 (noting that women are unlikely
to be sentenced to death).
149. See Death Penalty for Female Offenders, supra note 27, at 3 (finding that few women are
presently awaiting executions).
150. See Ferris, Hendrick & Burritt, supra note 147, at 10A (noting that more than 98% of
death penalty sentences for women are ultimately overturned); see also Death Penaltyfor Female
Offenders, supranote 27 (documenting that of the 120 women sentenced to death since January
1, 1973, 65 have had their sentences reversed, seven have had them commuted, 45 are currently
still on death row, and only three have actually been executed).
151. Victor L. Streib, Dean and Professor of Law, The Claude W. Retit College of Law, Ohio
Northern University.
152. Death Penaltyfor Female Offenders, supranote 27, at 3; see also Ferris, Hendrick & Burritt,
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that small number has fallen significantly, with only forty-one of 7,729
executions of women in the twentieth century, or 0.5%. 5'
Since 1973, the post-Furman era of the death penalty, 120 death
sentences have been imposed on female defendants."M Of those 120,
only forty-four females remain on death row today.5 These women
constitute only 1.3% of the total death row population' and less than
0.1% of all women in prison in the United States.' 57 Three women
have been executed since 1973;"8 the remainder have either had
their sentences reversed or commuted.5
More than half (twentyfive) of all women on death row at the end of 1997 were sentenced in
only four out of the thirty-eight states that authorize the death
penalty: California, Texas, Florida, and Pennsylvania.16°
Florida,
North Carolina, and Texas are the
three
leading
states
for
convicting
16
and sentencing women to death.
By the end of 1997, there was a total of 3,335 prisoners on death
row. 62 Of these 3,335 prisoners, 98.5% were men 6" and just 1.5%
were women.TM These numbers simply do not correlate to the fact
that women are responsible for one in eight murders in this
country. '6 It is logical to suspect, based on the empirical evidence,
supranote 147, at 10A (noting that of 18,808 legal executions carried out in the United States
since 1608, only 514, or three percent, have been women).
153. See Death Penaltyfor Female Offenders, supra note 27, at 3 (showing that execution of

women comprises a small percentage of total executions).
154. See Death Penalty for Female Offenders, supra note 27, at 8 (providing characteristics of

offenders and victims in female death penalty cases).
155. See BULLETIN, supra note 109, at 7 (detailing that two women were received under
sentence of death in 1997, while five women were removed from death row).
156. See Death Penaltyfor Female Offenders, supra note 27, at 8 (reflecting the low number of

women on death row).
157. See DeathPenaltyforFemaleOffenders, supra note 27, at 8.
158. SeeDeath PenaltyforFemaleOffenders, supranote 27, at 10-11 (listing Velma Butterfield in

North Carolina, Nov. 2, 1984; Karla Faye Tucker in Texas, Feb. 3, 1998, andJudias Buenoano in
Florida, Mar. 30, 1998).
159. SeeDeath Penaltyfor Female Offenders, supra note 27, at 11-16 (listing the status of women

on death row that had not been executed).
160. See BULLEIN, supra note 109, at 7 (noting California had eight, Texas had seven,
Florida had six, and Pennsylvania had four).
161. See BULLETIN, supra note 109, at 7 (Figure 1) (identifying four states in which no
women were under a capital sentence).
162. See BULLETIN, supra note 109, at 7 (Table 7) (citing the number of women held in
thirty-four state and federal prisons).
163. SeeBULLE IN, supranote 109, at 8 (providing a breakdown of total prisoners by gender
and race).
164. See BUi.LETIN, supra note 109, at 8 (asserting that it is nearly impossible for the 50
women sitting on death row to be responsible for one-eighth of this country's murders).
165. See Death Penaltyfor Female Offenders, supra note 27, at 3 (indicating that about one in
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that discrimination is responsible for the differences in convicting
and sentencing men and women to death.
A.

State Conviction and SentencingData

1. Florida
Significantly, just as Florida, North Carolina, and Texas lead the
nation in convicting and sentencing women to death, it is only in
these three states that any women have actually been executed since
1973-one woman in each state.166 Between January 1973 and October
1998, Florida convicted for murder and sentenced to death fifteen
females. 67 Florida is a leader both in numbers of total death
sentences and in numbers of women sentenced to death16e At the
end of 1997, Florida had 370 prisoners on death row.' 69 This is
greater than ten percent of the total of 3,335 prisoners 0 in the
country under a sentence of death at the time. Florida executed
Judias Buenoano in March of 1998.' In light of these numbers, one
might assume that Florida's rates of convictions and sentences to
death for women might be on par with those of men in the state, but
that is not the case. Of its 387 total prisoners on death row as of
October 1, 1998, only four were women. 7 1 Florida is just one
example of the disparity that exists between men and women who
receive a death sentence.
2.

North Carolina

Given its relative population, North Carolina leads in both total
eight or 13% of murder arrests are of women); see alsoJONES, supra note 44, at 4 (noting that
the rate of murders committed by women has remained steady at 15% for as long as records
have been kept); KERRY SEGRAVE, WOMEN SERIAL AND MASS MURDERERS: A WORLDWIDE
REFERENCE, 1580-1990 2 (1992) (stating that "statistics for murder... show that only 10 to 15%

of murders are committed by females.
consistent over time .... ").

The percentage of female killers has been fairly

166. See Death Penaly for Female Offenders, supra note 27, at 10-11 (showing that all other

women sentenced to death had their sentence reversed, commuted, or are now on death row).
167. See Death Penalty for Female Offenders, supra note 27, at 6 (ranking Florida first in the

number of women sentenced to death).
168. See Bulletin, supra note 109, at 14 (showing the number of prisoners under sentence of
death by state and years of sentencing).
169. See BULLETIN, supranote 109, at 1 (following California and Texas with the number of
prisoners under sentence ofdeath).
170. BULLETIN, supra note 109, at 1.
171. See Death Penaltyfor Female Offenders, supranote 27, at 3 (relating this execution to the

first execution of a woman in 14 years one month earlier).
172. See Year-End Repor, supra note 28, at 4 (comparing the number of executions in other
states).
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prisoners under a death sentence and women prisoners under
sentence of death.1 73 Between January 1973 and December 1996,
North Carolina convicted and sentenced to death thirteen females. 74
As of October 1998, North Carolina had 207 prisoners on death
row. 175
Again, it would seem logical that a state that applies the death
sentence with such regularity might apply it proportionately to both
men and women. This is not the case in North Carolina. Of the 207
prisoners on death row in October 1998 only three were women."
North Carolina last executed a woman in November 1984,177 when it
put Velma Barfield 78 to death. North Carolina offers another
example of the disproportionate rate at which men receive the death
sentence as compared to women.
3.

Texas

One final state that provides empirical evidence of the
disproportionate application of the death penalty in the U.S. capital
justice system is Texas. Texas convicted and sentenced to death
eleven women between the years 1973 and 1996.17' The number of
women remaining under sentence of death as of October 1998 was
seven. 8 ' This is a virtually negligible number when compared to the
total of 436'18 prisoners on Texas' death row at the same time.
Texas has always been a leader in convicting and sentencing to
death defendants accused of murder.'82 It has executed 144 prisoners
since 1977,1' and a total of 441 since 1930.284 This is almost ten
173. See Bulletin, supra note 109, at 1 (following Texas and California with the number of
prisoners sentenced to death).
174. See Death Penaltyfor Female Offenders, supra note 27, at 6 (following Florida with the

number of women receiving death sentences).
175. See
North
Carolina
(visited
Jan.
1,
<http://wv.essential.org/dpic/northcarolina.htm>.
176. See id. (indicating that 10 executions have taken place as of Oct. 28, 1998).

1999)

177. SeeDeath PenaltyforFemaleOffenders, supra note 27, at 4.
178. See DeathPenaltyforFemaleOffenders, supranote 27, at 4.
179. See Death Penaltyfor Female Offenders, supranote 27, at 6 (following Florida and North

Carolina with the highest number of women receiving death sentences).
180. See Texas (visitedJan. 1, 1999) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/texas.html>.
181. See id. (indicating that 160 executions have taken place as of Oct. 28, 1998).
182. See Year-End Report, supra note 28, at I (stating that in 1998, Texas led the country with
20 executions, while Virginia was second with 13).
183. SeeBULLEIN, supranote 109, at 10 (reflecting the highest number of persons executed
among the states since 1977).
184. See BULLETIN, supra note 109, at 10 (reflecting the highest number of persons executed
among the states since 1930).
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percent of the total 4,291 prisoners executed in the United States
between 1930 and 1997" and close to one-third of the 432
executions that were carried out in the United States between 1977
and 1997.183 Between January 1, 1998 and November 30, 1998, Texas
executed seventeen people-almost thirty percent of total executions
in the United States for the year. 87 Once more, it is clear that the
numbers of men to women who are executed are vastly different; only
one woman was executed1 88
B. Studies -Preferential Treatmentfor Women
In 1997, the South and the West experienced higher rates of
violent crime than the Northeast and the Midwest.189 Of a total
501,353 arrests for violent crimes, 80,975, or 16.2% were committed
by females. 90 One thousand three hundred and seventeen, or 10.3%
of a total 12,764, arrests for murder or non-negligent manslaughter
were females.'91 By contrast, men were arrested for 11,447, or 89.7%
of murders, and for 420,378, or 83.8%, of total violent crimes. 92 Both
sets of numbers represent an overall decrease from 1996 to 1997, for
both males and females, in the numbers of arrests for murders.19
They also indicate an overall decline in total arrests of males for all
violent crimes, 94 but an increase in total arrests of females for all
violent crimes.'95
A number of studies have been conducted over the years to
determine whether, in fact, women receive preferential treatment in
the judicial system, particularly when it comes to women who
185. SeeBULLETIN, supranote 109, at 10 (citing 4,291 executions in all 50 states since 1930).
186. SeeBULLETIN, supranote 109, at 10 (leading the states in executions with 98 executions
since 1997).
187. See BuLLmur,
supra note 109, at 12 (leading the states in executions performed in
1998).
188. SwBULLETIN, supranote 109, at 12 (showing that 18 states have executed 58 prisoners,
only 2 of which have been women).
189. See FED. BuREAu OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES
12 (1997) [hereinafter UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS] (documenting the South recording 682
violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants and the West as recording 652 per 100,000 inhabitants,
as compared to 536 for the Northeast and 526 for the Midwest). Murders accounted for one
percent of all violent crimes. Id.
190. See id at 239 (reflecting a lower percentage of women arrested for violent crimes than
for all crimes).
191. See id at 239 (constituting 0.1% of all crimes committed bywomen).
192. See id at 239 (constituting 3.5% of all crimes committed by women).
193. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 189, at 231 (showing a greater decrease in
arrests for women).
194. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 189, at 231 (reflecting a decrease of 1.7%).
195. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 189, at 231 (reflecting an increase of 4.8%).
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murder. 196 One classic early study, Patterns of CriminalHomicide,'97 was

published in 1957. The results of the study showed that, "[a]s always,
the courts were more lenient with these and other women than with
men, convicting them at a lower rate, but above all of lesser degrees
of homicide, carrying much lighter sentences. " "' A more recent
study produced similar findings; a study conducted in 1978 of
California's sentencing practices in felony cases concluded that fewer
women were incarcerated for similar crimes than their male

counterparts. 199 A 1983 study of Florida's sentencing practices made
2
similar findings. 00
Researchers have found that there is often no significant difference
in the treatment of men and women at earlier stages in the judicial
process, such as at the negotiating, prosecuting, or convicting
stages.20' Rather, it is most often at the sentencing stage where
gender plays a role. 02 A 1989 study that was based on interviews with
twenty male and female judges in New York and Massachusetts found
that women generally received lighter sentences than men. 213
196. See infra notes 198-206 and accompanying text (discussing the disparity between men
and women in the penal system).
197. See LANE, supranote 46, at 254-55 (documenting Marvin Wolfgang's classic study of 635
homicide cases investigated by the Philadelphia police between 1948 and 1952). Philadelphia
was a typical urban region for the time period, with a murder rate of 5.7 per 100,000
inhabitants annually. Id. at 255. Eighteen percent of the offenders reported were female. Id,
at 256. One hundred of those murders reported were domestic homicides; they were split fairly
evenly, with 53 husbands accused of killing their wives and 47 wives accused of killing their
husbands. I& Of the 53 accused men, 36 actually went to trial. Of these 36, 34 (94%) were
found guilty as charged. Id. Of the 47 accused women, 42 had been tried at the time the study
was published. LANE, supranote 46, at 256. Only 26 (62%) were found guilty as charged. Id.
198. LANE, supranote 46, at 256.
199. See Frank H. Julian, Different Crime, Different Treatment?, in FEJMALE CRIMINALITY: THE
STATE OF THE ART 349 (Concetta C. Culliver ed., 1993) (citing 1978 study conducted by E.
Moulds). The study controlled for race, offense, and prison record. Id.
200. See id. (citing 1983 study conducted by Frazier, Bock & Henretta). The study
controlled for one dozen social and legal variables, and found that men were still 23% more
likely to be jailed than women, when each had committed similar crimes. Id.
201. See id. at 351.
202. See Ilene Nagel & John Hagan, Gender and Ciime: Offense Patterns and Criminal Court
Sanctions, in CRIME ANDJUSrcE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF REsEARCH (Vol. 4, 91-144) (M. Tonry &

M. Morris eds., 1982).

203. SeeJulian, supra note 199, at 353 (citingJ. Daly, RethinkingJudicialPaternalism:Gender,
Work-Family Relations, and Sentencing in GENDER AND SOCETI 3(1):9-36).
Daly found

paternalistic attitudes among judges were fairly pervasive-the attitudes were directed mostly
toward mothers. Id. at 353. Mothers who were taking care of their children were thought of as
.good." Id. Those who were not (for whatever reasons) were perceived as irresponsible. Id.
Daly also found that White women received greater deference than both men and minority
women. Id. at 358. Women of maturity, status, respectability, and mothers of minor children
all appeared to receive leniency from the courts. Julian, supranote 199, at 358.
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Another study published in 1989 analyzed the cases of female felons
in six states, and compared the females to a matched sample of
males."' The primary conclusion from this study was that, in most
cases, even with well-matched male and female offenders, the females
tended to receive lenient sentencing for similar crines.

2°5

These

studies seem to indicate that women are less likely than men to
receive jail time for violent crimes.
C. RationalesforDifferent Treatment
There are currently few theories that explore why women receive
the death penalty at such a different rate than men, particularly
since research suggests that female and male killers are similar in
more ways than they are different.211 Women and the death penalty
do not seem to be two topics often discussed together in the legal
arena, 20 and yet the fact remains that women do receive different
treatment.29 Those who sit in judgment are hesitant to impose harsh
sentences on women, particularly a sentence of death.1 0
What are the factors, then, that will cause ajudge or jury to convict
and impose a harsh sentence on a woman? First, nearly half of the
204. See Dean J. Champion, A Comparative Analysis of Female Felons: Some Recent Trends in
Sentencing Severity Compared uith a Matched Sample ofMale Offenders, in FEMALE CRIMINAIT: THE
STATE OF THE ART 363 (Concetta C. Culliver ed., 1993) (studying female felons in Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia from 1983 to 1985). He matched the male
sample for age, race, socio-economic characteristics, prior records, and other demographic
data. Id. at 370. He also controlled for the judges sentencing both samples. Id.
205. See id. at 371 (noting that even implementing sentencing changes in the various states
to address the disparate sentences received by males and females, there were still quite
considerable discrepancies in sentencing). The study also concludes that at other stages,
females receive lenient treatment in that police are less likely to arrest a female, prosecutors are
less likely to go fonard with what might be an unpopular prosecution and juries tend to be
sympathetic to females. Id. Champion also notes the rarity of executions of female felons for
capital crimes, despite the fact that many of them were convicted in various states that had
death penalty statutes. Id.
206. SeeJermy E. Carroll, Note, Images of Women and CapitalSentencingAmongFemaleOffenders:
Exploring the Outer Limits of the Eighth Amendment andArticulated Theories ofjustice 75 TEX. L. REV.
1413, 1414 (1997) (noting the dearth of studies on women and capital punishment).
207. See FLOWERS, supra note 147, at 88 (describing the findings of John Humphrey and
John Kirkpatrick in their two-year study, Stress in the Lives of Female CriminalHomicide Offenders).
The co-authors interviewed both males and females jailed for committing murder or
manslaughter, and found that individuals in both groups suffered from abusive backgrounds
and low socio-economic status. Id.
208. See Carroll, supra note 206, at 1415 n.16 (noting that a search of Westlaw using the
terms "female" or "woman" in addition to either "death penalty" or "capital" produced only
four articles). This was also the author's experience while researching this Comment.
209. See discussion supra at Part IV.B (discussing studies that indicate that women receive
preferential treatment).
210. SeeJulian, supranote 199, at 343 (quoting one criminal court judge as admitting "It's
difficult to send a mature woman to prison. I keep thinking... Hey! She's somebody's
motherl").
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women on death row are there for killing family members or other
intimates, such as a boyfriend.2 1 ' Additionally, most of these women
have killed for economic gain.212 Historically, men and women have
been viewed as fundamentally different creatures.
The
characteristics attributed to women are not necessarily considered
positive attributes; 2 14 women are often thought to be the worst kinds
of criminals and are viewed as overemphasizing
the "typically female"
5
traits of emotionalism or sexuality.2
211. See Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of Capital
Domestic Murder in the Post-FurmanEra, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1517 (1996) [hereinafter Capital

Murder and the Domestic Discount] (noting that about one-half of the men on death row for
murdering family or intimates killed in retaliation for a woman leaving a sexual relationship,
while this reason was quite rare among the female killers). Two-thirds of the women killed for
pecuniary gain, a motive notably lacking among the men. Id.
212. See id. at 1517-18 (stating that society looks at women killing for economic gain as the
worst type of female crime). Barbara Stager was given the death sentence in North Carolina.
Id. at 1517-18 (relating the story of Stager as an example). Stager shot her sleeping husband to
prevent him from learning of her bad debts, and to recover financially. Id. at 1518. At her trial,
evidence was introduced that indicated she had killed her first husband in the same manner.
Rapaport, supra note 211, at 1518. Judi Buenoano was also convicted of killing her husband.
Id. at 1519 n.42 (illustrating the stigma attached to a crime because of the murderer's gender).
At her trial, a witness testified that Buenoano advised her that instead of divorcing her husband,
she should take out more life insurance on him and then poison him. Id.; see also THOMAS S.
DUKE, CELB RATED CRIMINAL CASES OF AMERICA 437-40 (1991) (relating the story of Mrs. Belle

Gunness, a serial murderer in the early 1900s). Mrs. Gunness was suspected of killing two
husbands; one died ofheart failure, which his relatives suspected was actually caused by poison.
The other died when a meat cleaver "fell" off a shelf and split his head open. Mrs. Gunness
collected life insurance on both men. It is suspected that she killed at least three other men
after acquiring money from them. In April 1908, her house burned down killing her and her
three children. When police subsequently investigated the suspected arson, they discovered a
private graveyard in Mrs. Gunness' backyard. Id.
Murders by females for economic gain are found throughout American history. See generally
KERRY SEGRAVE,

WOMEN

SERIAL AND MASS MURDERERS: A WORLDWIDE

REFERENCE,

1580

1990, 92-97 (1992) (documenting various female serial and mass murderers
throughout the centuries). Nannie Doss was convicted of killing 10 people, including four
husbands, by arsenic poisoning between 1924 and 1954. Id. at 92. Although she collected life
insurance on many of them, she told the court at her trial that she killed one "because he got
on my nerves." Id. at 95. The prosecutor in the case sought the death penalty, but the judge
accepted a guilty plea and sentenced Doss to life imprisonment. Id.
Between 1912 and 1921, in Chicago, Tillie Klimek killed nine men, mostly her husbands, by
arsenic poisoning. Id. at 192. The prosecutor in this case also sought a sentence of death, but
Klimek received a life sentence. Id. at 195. Interestingly, the prosecutor sought to show that
women were generally treated more leniently than men when charged with similar crimes, and
specifically in cases of spousal murder. Id. He pointed out that in recent years prior to the
case, 28 women had been acquitted on charges of murdering their husbands. Of the four
women who had been convicted of the crime, one was judged insane, one was "more than
middle-aged," and the other two were termed "no beauties." Id.
213. SeeAuiSON MORRIS, WOMEN, CRIME AND CRIMINALJUSTICE 12 (1987) (explaining that
women are perceived as "pure, passive, dependent, submissive, selfless, caring and gentle,"
while men are perceived as possessing qualities opposite those of women).
214. See MORRIS, supra note 213, at 12 (describing women as 'childlike, narcissistic,
emotional,jealous, malicious, deceptive, sexual and unstable").
215. See MORRIS, supra note 213, at 12 (explaining that female murderers exhibit the
negative qualities inherent in women because they have not been "neutralized" by the more
positive qualities). An 1860 newspaper article described a murder thought to be committed by
THROUGH
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The theories postulated have been created largely at the behest of
feminists to explain why so few women receive the death penalty. 16
At present, these theories lack the extensive statistical support that
race and class discrimination studies have.2 17 The theories focus on
explaining why the actors in the capital justice system, from the
prosecutors who refer indictments, to judges who charge juries, and
the jurors themselves, are so reluctant to 8impose severe sentences on
women, particularly the death sentence.2
As one judge stated: "I don't think there's any rational or objective
thought about it, but there's a feeling that incarceration for a woman
is far more degrading than for a man ....
In fact, it seems that
judges consider different factors, dependent on the gender of the
defendant.220 Professor Victor L. Streib recognizes this reluctance,
particularly in judges, to convict and sentence women to death.221 He

notes that:
Even when all of the specific aggravating and mitigating factors are
the same for male and female defendants, females still tend to
Constance Kent as "a wanton murder, not done by the hand of a man, for there was a finesse of
cruelty about it that no man, we believe, however depraved, could have been guilty of: but it is
the revengeful act ofawoman... morbid, cruel and cunning." Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).
216. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rapaport, Some Questions About Gender and the Death Penalty, 20
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 501, 503-04 (1990) [hereinafter Some Questions About Gender]
(discussing the chivalry and evil woman theories);JONES, supranote 44, at 8-11 (discussing the
development of the chivalry theory).
217. Electronic mail correspondence from Professor Victor Streib, Ohio Northern
University, to the author (Nov. 21, 1998) [on file with the author] (commenting on the
difficulty writers on this subject have in obtaining information on women and murder). "As for
the data on women's homicides not resulting in the death penalty, I share your eagerness to
know. Those data are not available and are nearly impossible to obtain... Liz Rapaport...
Joan Howarth... and I have written about this over the years, but none of us have the precise
data." Id.
218. See Some Questions About Gender, supra note 216, at 506 (discussing that "gender bias
infects the administration of capital punishment" including the "discretion of prosecutors,
juries andjudges").
219. See Carroll, supra note 209, at 1418 n.24 (citing Angela Musolino, Judges' Attitudes
Toward Female Offenders 16 (1988) (unpublished manuscript)).
220. See Noreen L. Channels & Sharon D. Herzberger, The Role of Gender in PretrialDecision
Making; in FEMALE CRIMINAUTlI: THE STATE OF THE ART 321, 336 (Concetta C. Culliver ed.,
1993) (noting that the factors judges consider for pretrial release are different for men and
women). Little weight is accorded a woman's past record; judges look more to a woman's
marital and "mother" status. Id. Judges are more harsh with married women than with single
women in pretrial hearings, but are more lenient in sentencing married women than single
women. Id. at 338 (explaining that married women are rewarded for fulfilling a traditional
role, but at the same time are treated more harshly for acting inappropriately in this role). This
is attributed to "family paternalism" in the court system that weighs both the social and
economic costs of disrupting families. Id.at 323 (explaining that the cost of removing a mother
from her children is considered too high).
221. SeeVictor L. Streib, Death PenaltyforFemale Offenders, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 845, 875 (1990)
(commenting that "most observers" view female offenders as less dangerous than male
offenders andjudges believe that women are easier to rehabilitate than men).
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receive significantly lighter sentences in criminal cases generally.
Judges admit that they tend to be more lenient toward female
[o]ffenders in general. Also juries tend to be more lenient toward
female offenders, particularly in serious crimes, for a variety of
ingrained, cultural reasons ....This tendency is consistent with
the extraordinary low number of death sentences and executions
of adult female offenders in our history.2

These theories present an initial foundation for constructing a
disparate impact argument for men and women in the capital justice
systemY2 IfHjudges admit that they are more lenient towards women
and more reluctant to sentence them, it seems to follow that they are

harsher with men and their discrimination on the basis of sex is both
purposeful and knowing.224 They may not be able to explain why they
feel this way, but they certainly seem to recognize that they do feel
this way, and that they act in specific response to those feelings.s
1.

Chivalry Theory

The chivalry theory purports that few women are sentenced to
death because the legal field is largely a male arena, compounded by
the fact that the United States still operates as a paternalistic
society. 6 Women in American society are stereotyped as weak and
passive, creating and continuing men's protective attitude toward
women.27 Proponents of the chivalry theory postulate that the death
penalty is perceived as the ultimate sanction for violating the social
values and rights that society chooses to protect.18 These proponents
contend that the small number of women on death row is a result of
the "tradeoff women make between full moral, social, and legal
stature and certain social protections. " 2
One illustrative example of the paternalistic attitude in American
222. See id. at 877-78 (explaining how mitigating factors have an impact on sentencing).
223. See Some QuestionsAbout Gender, supranote 216, at 504 (discussing disparity of treatment
as a result of the chivalrous attitude of the court system).
224. See Some Questions About Gender, supra note 216, at 506 (commenting that actors in the
capitaIjustice system use their discretion to the advantage of women).
225. See Some Questions About Gender, supra note 216, at 504 (stating that Justice Marshall
recognized the presence of sex discrimination in the capital justice system).
226. See Carroll, supranote 206, at 1418 (explaining the reluctance of those in the criminal
justice system to impose the death sentence on women).
227. See Carroll, supra note 206, at 1418; Some QuestionsAbout Gender, supra note 216, at 504
(suggesting that the small number of women on death row is a result of society's "chivalrous
disinclination to sentence women to die").
228. See Carroll, supranote 206, at 1419 (explaining that society seeks to protect these values
and rights).
229. See Carroll, supra note 206, at 1419 (commenting that women choose a less moral,
social, and legal stature in exchange for protection).
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society is the case of Eithel Spinelli. Thirty male inmates offered to
draw straws so that one of them would be sent to the gas chamber in
Ms. Spinelli's place if the governor of California would not commute
her sentence. ° They petitioned the warden of San Quentin with the
following words:
[T]hat Mrs. Spinelli's execution would be repulsive to the people
of California; that no woman in her right mind could commit the
crime charged to her; that the execution of a woman would hurt
California in the eyes of the world; that both the law and the will of
the people were against the execution; that Mrs. Spinelli, as the
mother of three children, should have special consideration; that
California's proud record of never having executed a woman
should not be spoiled.2'
Essentially, the chivalry theory offers a traditional explanation of a
protective, paternalistic society to explain why so few women are
convicted and sentenced to death 23 2 Because of these stereotypes, it
is difficult for the actors in the capital justice system to condemn
female offenders to death, even those who
may have committed
3
offender.2
male
any
as
heinous
as
just
crimes
[L]ook at the paradoxical examples young girls are offered when
growing up-they are taught, on the one hand, that theirs is the
pacific, nurturing sex. No outlet is provided for their feelings of
anger and aggression. Yet they are human-it is ... no more than

stupidity to believe that they don't experience anger, hatred,
feelings of hostility. And as they do, they also hear different sorts
of stories ....

of cruel goddesses and wanton queens, whose very

creative or supreme power permits them to indulge in rage,
revenge, and destruction. What lesson would you take from it
all? 4
230. See Carroll, supranote 206, at 1417-18 (showing that even the male inmates did not like
the idea of a woman being sentenced to death).
231. See Some Questions About Gender, supranote 216, at 501 (quoting CLINTON T. Durrsr, 88
MEN AND 2 WoMEN 135-36 (1962)).
232. See MORRIS, supranote 213, at 101 (noting that certain women do not conform with the
stereotypical "appropriate" behaviors or appearances, specifically those who are divorced,
aggressive, sexual, or Black). She notes that Moulds argues for the use of the 'paternalism' in
such cases, instead of using 'leniency' because paternalism more accurately conveys the
underlying process. See id. (discussing Moulds' assertion that "lenient, paternalistic and harsh
dispositions are all linked to the perpetuation of traditional role stereotypes."). "Lenient
treatment is presented as conditional on the acceptance of stereotypical behaviour [sic);
paternalistic and harsh treatment as punishment for the breach of that behaviour in addition to
the breach of the criminal law." Id. (citing E. Moulds, Chivalry and Paternalism:Disparity of
Treatment in the CriminalJusticeSystenm in WOMEN, CRIME ANDJUSncE (S. Datesman & F. Scarpitti
eds., 1980)).
233. See Carroll, supranote 206, at 1418 (explaining that men feel protective toward women
because of women's dependence on them).
234. See CALEB CARR, THE-ANGEL OF DARKNESS 179 (1997) (explaining the reasons why some
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2. Evil Woman Theory
Another theory offered to explain why some women receive the
death sentence is the "evil woman" theory.ss The "evil woman" is that
rare woman who does receive the death penalty.2 6 Rather than
instilling in those who would judge her a feeling of paternalistic
protectionism, she is a woman whom judges and jurors are not
reluctant to sentence to death.r 7 However, even with the so-called
"evil woman," there is a tendency to try to explain her crime in such a
way as to make it more palatable to society.m
Professor Victor L. Streib has extensively studied the type of woman
who is often given the death penalty and found that she possesses
many of the same qualities as the typical male offender sentenced to
death23' She falls outside what society defines as an appropriately
feminine woman.2 0 Particularly affected by this purported definition
of the true feminine woman is the Black woman.2 1' Two-thirds of
women executed since colonial times have been Black.
In the
Twentieth Century the percentage of Black
women
who
have
been
2 3
executed has been lower than in the past.

women feel compelled to kill).
235. See Carroll, supranote 206, at 1422 (explaining that the evil woman theory claims that a
woman becomes eligible for execution when she acts in a manner forbidden by society).
236. See Carroll, supra note 206, at 1423 (explaining that the evil woman is punished to set
an example and prevent other women from straying outside of the traditional expectations).
237. See Carroll, supranote 206, at 1423 (discussing the execution of evil women as a way for
society to determine the "outer limits" of acceptable gender roles).
238. See No

ANGELS:

WOMEN WHO

COMMrr

VIOLENCE xi, xiii (Alice Myers & Sarah

Wight

eds., 1996) (describing the attempt to translate a violent woman's actions into less threatening
terms by explaining them away). Society excuses the woman's "unwomanly" behavior because
she is either mad - hysterical, insane, or suffering from premenstrual syndrome, or Battered
Women's Syndrome. Attributing these conditions to a violent woman allows ajudge or jury to
be more lenient with the woman; the conditions provide excuses and take away the "normal"
responsibility she might exercise over her own actions. Id.
239. See Streib, supra note 221, at 878 (describing the women executed from colonial times
to the present day as generally poor, uneducated and of the lowest social class). The victims of
these women sentenced to death also tend to be White, and belong to a particularly protected
class, such as children. Id. Professor Streib further describes the crimes and behaviors of these
women as more like those of the stereotypical male killer. Id. at 879.
240. See Streib, supra note 221, at 879 (suggesting that traditional social protection is not
extended to female offenders who are sentenced to death because they share many of the same
characteristics as their male counterparts).
241. SeeJoan W. Howarth, Feminism, Lawyering, and Death Row, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 401,417 n.85 (1992) (sighting to Barbara Smith's comments that Black women were not
thought of as females); see also Claire M. Renzetti, Connecting the Dots: Women, Public Policy, and
Social Contro in CRIME CONTROL AND WOMEN: FEMINIST IMPLICATIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PoLIcY 181, 185-86 (Susan L. Miller ed., 1998) (commenting that Black women are "stereotyped
as violent, dangerous, and immoral").
242. See Streib, supranote 221, at 866 (noting that in the Twentieth Century, the percentage
of Black women who have been executed has decreased).
243. See Streib, supranote 221, at 879 (stating that 39% of women executed in the Twentieth
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Additionally, lesbians are also convicted and sentenced to death at
disproportionately high rates. 2" Our societal propensity to convict
and sentence to death women who at some points in history were,
and too often still are, considered to exist outside the accepted norm
of the "feminine woman" illustrates society's need to make a woman
appear unacceptable to the mainstream before it condemns her to
death.24 5
The "evil woman" theory posits that, when a woman commits a
crime for which ajudge or juror has no reluctance to sentence her to
death, she offends society as a whole with her "unladylike" behavior. 6
This image of a woman straying from her expected role in society
allows the legal system to rein in and dispose of these "evil" women,
thereby perpetuating the protective, paternalistic society. 47 It also
leaves society with a very narrow definition of what constitutes a true
woman-seemingly, it is a white woman of middle or upper class
status.24' As a result, women are most vulnerable to attack by the
judicial system when they step outside the bounds of normative
femininity.249

Century were Black and since 1973, 25% of women given the death sentence were Black).
244. See Carroll, supra note 206, at 1424 n.59 (citing Victoria A. Brownworth, Dykes on Death
Row, ADVOCATE (Los Angeles), June 16, 1992, at 62) (noting that in 1992, 17 of the 41 women
on death row were lesbians, and three of them were sentenced in that year). Victor Streib also
suggests that prosecutors attempt to portray female defendants as lesbians even when they are
not because it helps the prosecutor "defeminize" the defendants. See Carroll, supranote 206, at
1424 n.59).
245. See Carroll, supranote 206, at 1423 (noting that if being a woman traditionally affords
one greater protection under the law, the womanhood of those who are executed must be
made "invisible" to the jury).
246. See Carroll, supra note 206, at 1421 (stating that women who commit such heinous
crimes actually violate two societal values: they offend the very idea of femininity with their
"unladylike" behavior, and, like male criminals, they offend humanity with their crimes); see also
Some Questions About Gender, supra note 216, at 512-13 (explaining that when a woman is
perceived to be guilty of a stereotypically "male" offense, she is likely to be more harshly
punished because she has violated stereotypical gender expectations).
247. See Howarth, supra note 241, at 414 (defining capital punishment as a control of social
power by which the wielders of this power not only keep all members of society in check, but
particularly women who stray from their stereotypical role in society).
248. See Howarth, supra note 241, at 417 (noting that the women who are sentenced to
death are disproportionately Black and are all poor).
249. See Renzetti, supra note 241, at 185 (commenting that women who choose to live alone,
single mothers and white women who date minority men are all viewed as living outside
feminist norms and therefore are subject to unfair treatment in the criminal justice system).
"Black women do not conform to normative femininity by virtue of their race, but instead of
being viewed as vulnerable, [b]lack women are considered immune from attack because they
are stereotyped as violent, dangerous and immoral." Id.at 186.

460

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAw

[Vol. 8:2

D. EqualProtectionAnalysis
1. Arizona v. Whitem
In Arizona v. White,2s defendant Michael Ray White appealed his
conviction of first-degree murder and subsequent death sentence.5 2
Among the fourteen issues on which White appealed, 25" he claimed
that his equal protection rights were violated because his female codefendant, who was convicted for the same crime, received life
imprisonment instead of the death sentence.'
White argued that
this was the result of sex discrimination because, despite the fact that
women commit ten percent of all murders in Arizona,2 s no woman
had received a death sentence under the then current Arizona
sentencing guidelines.ss

250. 815 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 405 (1992).
251. 815 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1991).
252. See id. at 873 (noting that the lower court declined to find leniency).
253. See id. at 871-72 (listing the fourteen issues to be addressed on appeal). The fourteen
issues included:
Did the trial court err in refusing to give ajury instruction concerning the jury's role
in determining the admissibility of a co-conspirator's statement?[;J 2. Did the trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury that it must disregard a co-conspirator's statements
that fell outside the scope of the conspiracy found by the jury deny the defendant his
right to a trial byjury?[;] 8. Did the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on its role
in determining the admissibility of hearsay statements deprive the defendant of his
constitutional right to confrontation?[;] 4. Did the trial court err in admitting hearsay
statements made (a) By a co-conspirator after the shooting, which defendant claims
were neither in "furtherance of" nor "in the course of" the conspiracy?[;] (b) By the
defendant relating to the co-conspirator's efforts to enlist defendant in the plan to kill
the victim? 5. Did the trial court err in admitting testimony that defendant was
bigamist and further err in denying his motion for a mistrial?[;] 6. Is the defendant
entitled to a new trial because of the cumulative effect of the evidentiary errors?[;] 7.
Does "conviction of conspiracy to murder and aiding and abetting murder constitute
double jeopardy?"[;] 8. Was due process denied when this court refused to order a
mental examination after a prima fade showing of incompetency to assist in the
appeal?[;] 9. Did the death qualification voir dire of the jury improperly prejudice the
jury and deprive the defendant of his right to an impartial jury in violation of the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article 2, §§ 1, 4,
23 and 24 of the Arizona Constitution?[;] 10. Was the imposition of the death penalty
inappropriate in this case when the only aggravating factor found by the trial court was
that the murder was committed in expectation of pecuniary gain?[;] 11. Was equal
protection denied because a female co-defendant received life imprisonment for the
same crime?[;] 12. Was appellant denied the right to provide mitigation evidence to
this court[;] 13. Is Arizona's capital punishment statute constitutional under the
various arguments presented herein?[;] and, 14. Was the death sentence under the
circumstances of this case excessive and/or disproportionate to the crime.
Id. at 871-72.
254. See id. at 882 (claiming that he was discriminated against because of his sex).
255. See id. at 882.
256. See Arizwna, 815 P.2d at 882 n.2 (noting that, since the appeal was presented to the
court, at least one woman, DebraJean Mike, was sentenced to death).
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The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed with White's contention,25
holding that the sentencing jury's finding of an aggravating
circumstance, with no finding of mitigating circumstances, was
enough to qualify the defendant for the death sentence.s

In

contrast, the female co-defendant's jury did find mitigating
circumstances and thus recommended leniency for her.29 Therefore,
the court found no merit to the defendant's equal protection claim.26 °
The court supported its finding by referring to an earlier case in
which it had defined equal protection "as it applies to capital
sentencing."261 "Equal protection of the laws here means only that
the death penalty may be applied to all persons in the state in a like
position ....
Equality of treatment does not destroy individualization of
sentencing to fit the crime and the individual persons convicted of the
same crime can constitutionally be given different sentences. " "
However, there is evidence throughout history indicating the
unwillingness of those sitting in judgment to convict women of
violent crimes or felonies, or to impose a prison or death sentence on
261
any such convicted woman.
Unfortunately, based on such holdings as in McCleskey v. KemV'
and Arizona v. Mhite, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will hear
257. See id. at 882 ("We disagree. Our statutory sentencing scheme provides for the death
sentence upon a finding of one or more aggravating circumstances and no mitigating
circumstances sufficient to warrant leniency. The propriety of the death sentence, therefore, is,
and must be, made on a case-by-case basis. The statute is gender-neutral.") (citation omitted).
258. See State v. White, 815 P.2d 869, 882-83 (Ariz. 1991) (noting that the defendant
committed the actual killing).
259. See id. at 883 (explaining that the court took into account that the co-defendant was a
"kind and caring mother, [the] death sentence would be devastating to her six-year-old
daughter... [and her] difficult marriage to Clifford Minter followed by a difficult
dissolution"); see also Lorraine Schmall, Forgiving Guin Garcia: Women, the Death Penalty and

Commutation, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S LJ. 283, 288 (1996) (commenting that though there may bejust
as many male murderers as female murderers who have suffered abuse and might be
considered "similarly situated" persons for purposes of sentencing, men in the capital justice
system are not afforded the same opportunity as women to tell their stories).
260. See White, 815 P.2d at 882 (holding that there is a rational basis for the different
sentences imposed).
261. Id. at 883.
262. See White 815 P.2d at 883 (citing State v. Maloney, 464 P.2d 793, 799 (Ariz. 1970))
(emphasis added) (stating that Arizona's laws do not violate equal protection because all
persons who commit murder have an equal chance ofbeing sentenced to death).
263. SeeLANE, supra note 46, at 26 (noting that in medieval times, women who were indicted
for murder were acquitted more often than men, even if the woman actually caused the death).
Colonial juries also freed women indicted for murder more often than they did men. Id. at 56
(commenting on the similarities the colonial system shared with the English medieval system).
264. 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987), cert. granted sub nom. McCleskey v. Zant, 496 U.S. 904 (1990),
aff'd, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (finding no proof of racial discrimination in applying the death
penalty).
265. 815 P.2d 869, 883 (Ariz. 1991) (finding that the imposition of different sentences for
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an equal protection challenge to the death penalty based on sex
discrimination anytime in the near future. 66
The Court has
implemented fairly insurmountable barriers to succeeding with such
a claim. 67 This, however, is not reason enough to stop exploring the
ways in which such a challenge might be framed. 2,8 As one author
notes, there is a "disconnect between constitutional theory and legal
270
practice" 269 that infects the current United States justice system.
Legal practitioners should seek to eliminate this disconnect.27'
For purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, the state death
penalty statutes do not, on their face, discriminate on the basis of
sex.272
They are seemingly gender-neutral with no suspect
classifications2 ' that would prompt the Court to review them with a
heightened level of scrutiny2 4 The Court has curtailed potential
claims of sex discrimination with its two established requirements for
such a finding: that a complainant be a member of a suspect class,
and that the state intended to discriminate when it developed the
challenged statute. 275 It has been argued that courts should abandon
co-defendants committing the same crime was not the result of sex discrimination).
266. See Some Questions About Gender, supra note 216, at 508 (commenting that sex
discrimination in death sentences is an "unlikely candidate for litigation").
267. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (describing the standard that must be met for an equal
protection challenge to succeed). "[A] defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has
the burden of proving 'the existence of purposeful discrimination.'" Id. (citing Whitus v.
Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967)). "A corollary to this principle is that a criminal defendant
must prove that the purposeful discrimination 'had a discriminatory effect' on him.'" Id.
(citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)). Id. at 293. "Thus, to prevail under
the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted
with discriminatory purpose." Id. (emphasis in original).
268. See Some QuestionsAbout Gender,supranote 216, at 508 (stating that the inequality in the
capital justice system is a reflection of women's unequal status in society).
269. Katheryn K. Russell, Book Review, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American
CriminalJusticeSystem, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1999, at 1 (Book World) (reviewing DAVID COLE,
No EQUALJUSncE: RACE AND CLASS INTHEAMERICAN CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM (1998)).
270. See id.(discussing the inequalities in the United States criminal justice system).
271. See CapitalMurderand theDomesticDiscoun supranote 211, at 514 (stating that the court
system imposes the death penalty in an "arbitrary and capricious manner").
272. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (a) (Harrison 1999) (stating the definition of a
murderer as one who "unlawfiflly and with malice aforethought, either express or implied,
causes the death of another human being").
273. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (noting Justice Brennan's
discussion ofsuspect classifications). "[C]lassifications based upon sex, like classifications based
upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore be
subjected to close scrutiny." Id.
274. See id.(noting "[classifications based upon sex.., are inherently suspect and must
therefore be subjected to closejudicial scrutiny").
275. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (holding that applying the Equal
Protection Clause does not preclude states from treating people in different classes differently).
The classification, however, must be related to the objective of the underlying statute, and that
objective may not be, in and of itself, discriminatory. Id.
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"the requirement of a showing of discriminatory purpose, in favor of
a principle recognizing a law's discriminatory impact as a
constitutional harm requiring justification by the state."27 6 If state
courts and the Supreme Court shifted focus from the underlying
intent of the law to the actual impact and effect of the law, an equal
protection challenge to the death penalty based on sex
discrimination could be successful.277
2.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196

78

Barring the success of an equal protection challenge, a defendant
might currently look to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964279 for
guidance in mounting a sex discrimination argument.2 0 The Court
stated in MCleskey that the use of statistics as proof of discrimination
in Title VII cases did not translate into their use in capital sentencing
decisions.28' The Court's argument, however, is not persuasive and
the dissent in the case argued that the use of statistics is valid in both
types of cases.'
276. See Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE LJ. 447, 488 (commenting that
states should be required to offer substantial justification for their discriminatory policies).
277. See id. (discussing how requiring proof of a wrongful purpose in cases of racial or sex
discrimination shifts the focus of the inquiry to those perpetrating the discrimination from the
actual harms caused to those discriminated against).
278. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1998).
279. Id.
280. See id. (providing statutory guidelines in disparate impact suits).
281. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294 (1987), cert. granted sub nom McCleskey v.
Zant, 496 U.S. 904 (1990), af/'d, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (discussing the differences in using
statistics for capital sentencing cases, venire-selection, and Title VII cases).
[E]ach particular decision to impose the death penalty is made by a petitjury selected
from a properly constituted venire. Each jury is unique in its composition, and the
Constitution requires that its decision rest on consideration of innumerable factors
that vary according to the characteristics of the individual defendant and the facts of
the particular capital offense. Thus, the application of an inference drawn from the
general statistics to a specific decision in a trial and sentencing simply is not
comparable to the application of an inference drawn from general statistics to a
specific venire-selection or Title VII case. In those cases, the statistics relate to fewer
entities, and fewer variables are relevant to the challenged decisions.
Id. at 294-95.
282. See id. at 350-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (refuting the majority's opinion that
statistics cannot be used to illustrate discrimination in capital sentencing decisions).
The Court treats the case as if it is limited to challenges to the actions of two specific
decisionmaking bodies--the petit jury and the state legislature. This self-imposed
restriction enables the Court to distinguish this case from venire-selection cases and
cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in which it long has accepted
statistical evidence and has provided an easily applicable framework for review ...
The primary decisionmaker at each of the intervening steps of the process is the
prosecutor, the quintessential state actor in a criminal proceeding.... Hence, my
analysis in this dissenting opinion takes into account the role of the prosecutor in the
Georgia capital sentencing system.
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Current equal protection law exists in the sphere of employment
law and is pursued largely under Title VII. 211

Sex discrimination

challenges may be asserted under Title VII through either a showing
of disparate treatment or disparate impact2s5 It appears from the
holding in Arizona v. White25 6 that a disparate treatment argument is
not a winning one. If it is accepted that equal treatment at trial does
not guarantee equal treatment at sentencing,2 7 then arguing that one
defendant is being treated differently from another will be
ineffectual.
A disparate impact argument seems more ideal for challenging the
death penalty on grounds of an equal protection violation based on
sex discrimination. Seemingly gender-neutral death penalty statutes
are resulting in vastly greater numbers of convictions and executions
for men than for women.s Statistics similar to those documented
throughout this Comment have been used to prove race
Id.
283. Unlawful employment practices include a failure or refusal to hire or to discharge any
individual, or to otherwise discriminate against any individual, on the basis of sex. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1998). It is also unlawful to deprive an individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect an individual's opportunities because of the
individual's sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2) (1998).
284. Disparate treatment requires that the complaining party show that he or she is being
treated differently and less favorably than other similarly situated individuals, based explicitly
on that party's race, sex, religion, or national origin. See BARTLETr & HARRIS, supra note 25, at
164-65 (stating also that disparate treatment cases may be brought individually, but also as a
.pattern and practice" claim in which the plaintiff must show that the treatment is a regimented
policy of the employer). See, e.g., Torre v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 862 F. Supp. 299, 301 (D.
Kan. 1994), affd, 124 F.Sd 218 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that plaintiff failed to meet her burden
of showing that defendants took adverse employment action based on her sex); Green v. USX
Corp., 896 F.2d 801, 806 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing failure to establish successful primafacie case
of disparate treatment because plaintiffs failed to show intentional discrimination against Blacks
due to their race).
285. A disparate impact challenge requires a showing by the complaining party that a
gender-neutral rule, regulation or requirement affects women disproportionately and is
unrelated to job performance. See BARTLETr & HARRIS, supranote 25, at 166 (stating that in
proving her case, the plaintiff need not show discriminatory intent and that when the primafacie
case is proven, the burden shifts to the employer to refute the allegations). See, e.g., Melendez v.
Illinois Bell Tel., 867 F. Supp. 637, 642 (N.D. Ill. 1994) aff'd, 79 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 1996)
(noting that a violation under a disparate impact claim is illustrated where it is shown that an
employer uses a specific employment practice that is neutral on its face, but has a substantially
adverse impact on a protected class and is not justifiable as a legitimate business goal); Council
31 v. Ward, 771 F. Supp. 247, 249 (N.D. 111.1991) (noting that in order to succeed with a
disparate impact argument, a complainant must prove a prima fade case, which includes
identifying a facially neutral employment practice that has a significant adverse impact on a
protected class).
286. 815 P.2d 869,883 (Ariz. 1991).
287. See i (holding that different persons convicted of the same crime can constitutionally
receive different sentences).
288. See Death Penaltyfor Female Offenders, supra note 27 (stating that death penalty statutes
use aggravating factors such as past criminal activity that tends to lead to the conviction of more
males than females because males have a more extensive prior criminal history record).
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discrimination in hiring practices.289 Courts have held use of statistics
insufficient in cases asserting sex discrimination in the workplace.2
The argument faces the even greater challenge of overcoming the
Supreme Court's rejection of statistical evidence to prove racial
discrimination in McCleskey v. Kemp.2 1 However, in light of the fact
that McCleskey is a plurality opinion, andJustice Powell, who authored
the opinion, changed his mind about using the death penalty,292 a
disparate impact argument based on illustrative statistics has the
chance of succeeding.
In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact under
Title VII, the complaining party must be a member of a suspect
class.y
For purposes of Tide VII, the best way to satisfy this
requirement would be to have a Black man file the challenge because
he would be considered a member of a protected class, and his case
would therefore be subject to heightened scrutiny29 4 by a court. A
Black man, might one day assert a successful challenge based on both
race and sex discrimination.
A member of a suspect class who is discriminated against on the
basis of immutable characteristics presents a persuasive case. The
Supreme Court recognizes only a small set of job-specific factors as
legitimate when opportunities are limited; immutable characteristics
such as skin color or sex are rarely considered legitimate limiting
factors. 5 It is arguable that being male and being Black are both
immutable characteristics.2s
The opportunity limited for this
289. See BARTLETr & HARRIs, supra note 25, at 165 (stating that "evidence of statistical
disparities that are especially pronounced may be sufficient" to meet the burden of showing
unlawful discrimination in a Title VII race discrimination case).
290. See id (noting that sex discrimination cases based on statistics alone have not
succeeded when brought under Title VII).
291. 481 U.S. 279, 294 (1987), aff'd, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
292. SeeJohn C.Jeffries, Jr., A Change of Mind that Came Too Late, N.Y. TImEs, June 23, 1994,
at A23 (quoting Justice Powell). "I have come to think that capital punishment should be
abolished." Id.
293. Title VII provides that an unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job
related for the position in question. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (I) (1998). Classifications
based on race, sex or national origin are viewed as inherently suspect. See Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (holding that classifications based on sex "are inherently
suspect and must therefore be subjected to closejudicial scrutiny.").
294. See Frontiero,411 U.S. at 682 (1973) (stating that classifications based on sex, race and
alienage should be subject to "closejudicial scrutiny").
295. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542, 549 (1971) (describing immutable
characteristics as those characteristics over which one has no control, such as height and age).
296. Sex and color are generally immutable characteristics; not easily changed. Both are
suspect classifications, subject to heightened scrutiny. See Frontiero,411 U.S. at 686-88 (1973)
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hypothetical defendant is that of living a long life. 7
Given the fairly short shrift afforded Michael White's argument by
the Arizona court, it is unlikely that an argument premised on sex
discrimination, that the death penalty violates equal protection
guarantees, will succeed in the near future25 Gender-neutral, but
vague, death penalty statutes leave room for judges and juries to act
on feelings and emotions.2
Such feelings and emotions produce
different outcomes in death penalty cases for men and women. 00
There is much debate about whether special treatment should be
accorded some defendants (and, by default, not others)."' Such
debate illustrates the Supreme Court's threshold of "willful and
knowing.",0 2 If there is open debate about treating defendants
(stating that what "differentiates sex from such non-suspect statuses as intelligence or physical
disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.").
297. Title VII prohibits limitation of opportunities based on an individual's sex or color. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(2) (1998).
298. See Arizona v. White, 815 P.2d 869, 882-83 (Ariz. 1991) (discussing White's alleged
equal protection violation). "The issue here, as the state points out, is whether defendant is a
member of a recognizable class, singled out by law or by practice for distinctive treatment
without a rational basis. We believe he is not. Male murderers are not singled out for capital
punishment." Id.
299. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987) (citing Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493,
503 (1972)). Individual jurors bring to their deliberations "qualities of human nature and
varieties of human experience, the range ofwhich is unknown and perhaps unknowable," Id.
300. See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrativeand Victim ImpactStatements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361,
384 (1996) (noting that "[e]ach individual is situated in her own experience").
301. See, e.g., Mark Hansen, Dead Woman Walking, 82 A.B.A.J. 24, 24 (Apr. 1996) (discussing
the belief that disparities in sentences for convicted murderers result from different
interpretations of aggravating and mitigating circumstances for men and women); FRANCES
HEIDENSOHN, WOMEN AND CRIME 207 (1995) (discussing sympathetic and active supporters of
battered women as motivated by fear of moral asymmetry); Victor L. Streib, Symposium: Death
Penalty for Battered Women, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 163, 163 (1992) (noting the stretching and
bending of the law to accommodate expanded defense arguments for battered women who
kill).
302. BARTLET & HARRIS, supra note 25, at 782-84 (discussing the suggestion put forth by
some commentators that mothers be afforded special treatment in sentencing, because they
suffer more from similar sentences).
The purpose ofjust punishment emphasizes consistency in sentencing. If the "same"
sentence has an inconsistent impact on two different defendants, then considering the
two sentences as equivalent is unjust. An incarcerative sentence may have a distinctly
different impact on a parent than it has on a non-parent.
See id.at 782 (quoting Eleanor Bush, Considering the Defendant's Children at Sentencing 2 FED.
SENT. REP. 194, 194 (1990)). But see Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a
Structured Sentencing System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices and the Sentencing of Female Offenders
Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines,85J. CRIM. L. & CpjMINOLOGY 181,208 (1994).
Such a policy would effectively use the criminal law to reward women for their status as
mothers (or, alternatively, to punish women for not having children). It would say, in
effect, "you have violated the criminal law, but we'll overlook that so you can do what
you're supposed to do-care for your children." This denies single-mother offenders
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differently, can the Court really continue to support a claim that
people do not "willfully and knowingly" do so?
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The capital punishment system in the United States directly
conflicts with the way other punishments and sentences are
determined and applied throughout the United States justice system.
The Supreme Court, whether consciously or not, has essentially made
this statement. 03 Most states currently have determinate sentencing
schemes, similar to the federal sentencing guidelines3°4 and
mandatory minimum sentence laws. 3 5 Both those who oppose and
those who support the death penalty endorse sentencing structures
that attempt to promote uniformity because both believe that
discrimination based on race, class, and gender exists in state
sentencing systems.306
These attempts to achieve uniformity in
sentencing directly conflict with the capital punishment scheme that
30 7
each defendant be considered an individual, on a case-by-case basis.
It is unreasonable to think that the United States can perfect a
sentencing system that strives to preserve both uniformity and
individuality at the same time.
the status of full moral agents and disregards the social contributions of childless
women, whose employment and community ties are not given the same consideration
in sentencing.
Id
303. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 289-90 (1987) (stating "[i] t would not make sense
for the system to require the exercise of discretion in order to be facially constitutional, and at
the same time hold a system unconstitutional in application where that discretion achieved
different results from what appear to be exact duplicates...").
304. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984), codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742, 28 U.S.C. § § 991-998 (1994) (setting forth numerous
guidelines for judges to impose sentences including the criteria to decide on a sentence taking
into account the nature and seriousness of the crime, as well as the need for the sentence
imposed).
305. See Christopher M. Alexander, Crushing Equality: Gender Equal Sentencing in America, 6
AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 199, 202 (1997) (noting that many states have also enacted "Three
Strikes" laws). These laws are efforts to prevent serious felonies; the rationale is that fear of an
automatic prison sentence will keep felons from repeating serious crimes. See id at 202 n.24
(citing CAL PENAL CODE §§ 667(a)(4), 667.5(c), 1192.7(c) (West 1995)). The code provides
that in California "such serious [violent] felonies include: (1) Murder or voluntary
manslaughter;... (7) any felony punishable by death or life imprisonment in the state prison."
Id.
306. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECr - RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENTS INAMERICA
164, 164-65 (1995). Liberals supported implementation of guidelines because they believed
that discrimination "in the criminal justice system was epidemic, that judges, parole boards, and
corrections officials could not be trusted, and that tight controls on officials' discretion offered
the only way to limit.., disparities." Id Conservatives supported guidelines because they
thought the guidelines would provide "greater certainty in sentencing and less coddling of
criminals by liberal judges and parole boards." Id.
307. Greggv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197 (1976).
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The Supreme Court and the states have worked for years
attempting to create a fair system."' 5 After observing the inequities
and arbitrariness of the system, individuals who have worked within
the system have reached the conclusion that they were unsuccessful
in creating a fair and unbiased system.a°n The system continues to fail
in achieving its purported deterrent purpose.3 '0 The death penalty is
a punishment that should be removed from al United States statutes.
Society must admit that death is a punishment that does not work. ""
It is used primarily as retribution against those perceived as the most
"deviant," and therefore the most threatening to societal norms,
instead of as a well-crafted and fair punishment for crimes
committed.3 1 2 There are cases of persons convicted of similar crimes
receiving dissimilar sentences. 3 0 There is no satisfactory, objective
explanation for such discrepancies in the system. The decision of
whether a defendant lives or dies is based on the individual beliefs
and life experience of the juror or judge.1 4 It is based on whether a
defendant and her victim are attractive or sympathetic." '

308. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240-41 (1972) (holding the death penalty
unconstitutional because of arbitrary imposition); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186-87
(1976) (holding the imposition of the death penalty as constitutional if the states develop
proper guidelines to diminish arbitrary outcomes).
309. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 292, at A23 (quoting Justice Powell, the author of the
plurality opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp as stating that he has changed his mind about capital
punishment, largely because of the arbitrary nature of the system, and that he wishes he had
voted the other way in McCleskey).
310. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 189, at 12 (documenting that although the
South imposes the greatest number and percentage of death sentences, and carries out the
largest numbers of executions, it still ranks ahead of the West, Northeast and Midwest for
numbers of violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants).
311. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supranote 189, at 12.
312. See Ashley Paige Dugger, Note, Victim Impact Evidence in CapitalSentencing. A Histoy of
Incompatibility,23 AM.J. CRIM. L. 375, 398 (1996) (noting that the United States' criminaljustice
system contemplates that the State will seek retribution for a murder victim because the victim
cannot do so).
313. See, e.g., Arizona v. White, 815 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1991) (holding that defendant, who was
convicted of first-degree murder, was appropriately sentenced to death, despite the fact that the
case involved only one aggravating factor while his co-defendant was not sentenced to death).
314. Bandes, supra note 300, at 384. See also Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge Over
Jury: Rorida's Practice of Imposing Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 31, 37
(1985) (discussing the increasing number of jury overrides by judges in Florida death penalty
cases). Ironically, the jury override was held constitutional in the post-Furman era so that "the
inflamed emotions of jurors can no longer sentence a man to die; the sentence is viewed in
light ofjudicial experience." Id. at 37 (citing Florida v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973)).
315. See Bandes, supra note 300, at 407 (discussing the attractive and unattractive victim).
"[If] there are loved, law-abiding, gentle and undeserving victims, then there must be unloved,
lawbreaking, violent, and deserving victims as well." Id.
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Existing state guidelines are not enough. They cannot eliminate
the arbitrary nature of the system because they cannot eliminate
individual beliefs and perceptions. Our culture remains one in which
women are often perceived as more sympathetic creatures than
men. 16 Judgments of death are reserved for those women who
blatantly and explicitly disturb society's notions of the "real"
woman. 31 7 Women who maintain, for the most part, the image of a
"real" woman will be spared from the ultimate sentence of death"15
Women's crimes are seen as aberrations, caused by a mental defect
or some weakness of character or by circumstances beyond their
control."9 Society chooses to protect these women; to put them
somewhere they cannot hurt others, but in a place where they have
the opportunity to contemplate their crimes, and to repent for them
and go on with their lives.320 Men in society are not afforded these
same protections and excuses.'
The United States must reach a consensus that the death penalty is,
in all cases, cruel and unusual punishment. The legislatures and the
courts need to fashion appropriate punishments for the crime of
murder that fall short of imposing state-sanctioned killing. Those
who recognize that the system does not work must assert challenges
in all possible instances, based on age, race, and sex. Forcing the
courts and the legislatures to keep reviewing the capital punishment
system is the only way to achieve official acknowledgment of the
arbitrary way in which the system is implemented.

316. See SCHtETZ, supra note 72, at 121 (noting juror did not want to convict Ethel
Rosenberg because Rosenberg was a mother).
317. See Ward, supra note 28, at 1A (reporting that the parole board in making its decision
weighed the crime and claims of rehabilitation and found that the gruesomeness of the crime
outweighed claims of rehabilitation). Karla Faye Tucker and a companion were sentenced to
death for bludgeoning two people to death, with a pickaxe, in June of 1983. The husband of
the woman Tucker killed stated that he could not forgive her for the brutal crime, and that his
wife would take care of her when Tucker got to the other side. The brutality of Tucker's crime
contributed to her failed pleas for clemency. See id. (describing that the "horrific nature of the
crime carried a lot of weight" in the Parole Board's decision).
318. See BARTLETr & HARMS, supra note 25, at 782-84 (discussing the desire of some to
afford mothers special treatment in sentencing consideration).
319. See discussion supra at Part IV.C (stating that women's crimes are caused by their
emotionalism or sexuality).
320. See Dean J. Champion, A ComparativeAnalysis of Female Felons: Some Recent Trends in
Sentencing Severity Compared with a Matched Sample of Male Offenders, in FEMALE CRIMINALIY: THE
STATE OFTHE ART 363, 363-73 (Concetta C. Culliver ed., 1993) (discussing the fact that females
receive more lenient treatment at virtually every state of the criminal justice process).
321. See id.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The people of the United States are unable to apply the death
penalty fairly. This is not a failing of the people, but rather of the
process.
It illustrates that people have consciences that often
override unfair and poorly implemented laws. A system that relies on
uniform guidelines which themselves are subject to individual
interpretation, no matter how well-crafted, must fail.
This lack of fairness seriously undermines the reliability of the
results reached in many cases and the trust that citizens are willing
to place in the court system. Unfortunately, many criminal justice
systems lack the most basic components of fairness: fair and
impartial judges, prosecutors free from political influences, and
effective representation for those accused of crimes.32

A violation of the Equal Protection Clause on the basis of sex is a
transgression of the Fourteenth Amendment, which adds to the
overall arbitrary nature of the system. The imposition of the death
penalty is always arbitrary and capricious. There is no genuine way to
circumvent these circumstances. Attempts to make the system
uniform infringe on the necessity of considering each defendant as
an individual. Such attempts serve only to illustrate that the current
system cannot adequately redress the disparate impact on men and
women, and is unconstitutional as applied. The clearest and most
obvious solution to this seemingly unsolvable problem is a complete
abolition of the death penalty in the United States.
The United States' capital justice system has failed. It cannot be
successful. It is a system that attempts to apply uniform treatment of
all defendants at the same time that it attempts to ensure
individualized consideration of each defendant. It is a system with
two different purposes that are at odds with one another. It is a
system with which the courts and legislatures need to stop
"tinkering," and abolish altogether.

322. See Stephen B. Bright, Casualtiesof the War on Crime: Fairness,Reliability and the Credibility
of CriminalJusticeSystems,51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 413,415 (1997).

